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 The past several decades have witnessed a revival of metaethical inquiry, marked 
by an increase both in the general interest in its philosophical implications and in the 
proliferation of novel positions within (and sometimes, challenging) the traditional 
metaethical categories.1  This revival can be attributed in part to the shifting of traditional 
methodological priorities, which has in turn widened the scope of issues considered to be 
legitimate subjects for metaethical inquiry.  Some have referred to this shift as marking 
the “Great Expansion” in ethics.2  The metaethical theories I will address in this paper 
(which I introduce below) are indicative of this revival. 
During the first part of the 20th century, the dominant methodology for addressing 
metaethical questions gave priority to semantic considerations over those of metaphysics 
and epistemology, as well as over the results of more generally empirical modes of 
inquiry.  Metaethicists during this period thought that the nature and meaning of moral 
discourse would be most clearly revealed through the project of providing analytic 
definitions of moral terms that reduce those terms to their purported non-moral 
synonyms.3  Mark Timmons notes4 that this dominant methodology began to face serious 
                                                 
1 For “new” moral realist theories, see, e.g. David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1994); Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005).  For “new” irrealist theories, see, e.g. Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) and Thinking How to Live (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2003); Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) and 
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).  For a helpful (though 
now, slightly outdated) overview of the recent metaethical literature, see Steven Darwall, Allan Gibbard, 
and Peter Railton, “Toward Fin de Siecle Ethics: Some Trends,” Philosophical Review 101 (1992): pp. 
115-89. 
2 Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992), p. 121. 
3 See, for instance, C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944); A.J. 
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover, 1946); R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1952).  One notable exception was G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1903).  Moore maintained that his “open question argument” demonstrated 
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challenges by mid-century, however, as Quine attacked the notion of analyticity that 
provided the conceptual foundation for reductive semantic analyses5 and Rawls broached 
questions of ethical justification without giving priority to semantic considerations.6  In 
the following decades, those interested in metaethical issues began to incorporate lessons 
from philosophy of language more generally, as well as from philosophy of mind, 
metaphysics, epistemology, cognitive science, and even anthropology.  This focus on 
canvassing the results from various areas of philosophical and empirical inquiry in order 
to achieve a metaethical outlook that coheres with a wide range of intellectual 
commitments—following Rawls’ recommendations in spirit, if not in letter—
characterizes the current fertile state of metaethics that has given rise to the theories I will 
discuss in this paper.       
 The new variants of the standard metaethical positions seek, almost without 
exception, to do justice to two separate types of consideration.  The first type concerns 
squaring one’s metaethical account with commonsense assumptions regarding what we 
are doing when we engage in moral discourse.  Timmons calls this project one of 
‘internal accommodation’.7  This project involves explaining, taking account of, or 
leaving room for presumed features of moral discourse such as its objective purport (i.e. 
that moral discourse is primarily fact- and not simply opinion-stating), the notion that 
moral progress is possible, the notion that moral conclusions may be reached through 
processes of reasoning, and so on.  The larger, unstated goal of the internal 
                                                                                                                                                 
that attempts to reductively analyze moral terms are bound to fail because they commit what he called the 
“naturalistic fallacy.”  
4 Mark Timmons, Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 25. 
5 W.V.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empricism,” Philosophical Review 60 (1951): pp. 20-43. 
6 John Rawls, “Outline of a Decision Procedure in Ethics,” Philosophical Review 60 (1951): pp. 177-97. 
7 Timmons (1999), pp. 11-2. 
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accommodation project may be thought of as defending the important role morality plays 
in our lives; if it turns out that the commonsense features of moral discourse enumerated 
above do not obtain, then, one might worry, many people will see no reason to continue 
giving their moral commitments the special kind of authority thought to be distinctive of 
morality.  The second project is one of ‘external accommodation’, which concerns 
squaring one’s metaethical account with commitments in other areas of inquiry, such as 
anthropology, evolutionary biology, other philosophical fields, and so on.  For instance, it 
is a virtue of a metaethical theory if it comports with a plausible, scientifically-informed 
worldview and that it does not posit entities which cannot be incorporated by 
correspondingly plausible metaphysical and epistemological accounts.   
 The challenge inherited by contemporary philosophers is that each of the two 
main metaethical categories—realism and irrealism8—does well at satisfying one of the 
accommodation projects but struggles (or, as some might complain, outright fails) to 
satisfy the other.  Geoffrey Sayre-McCord defines realism about some discourse as 
involving two theses: “(1) The claims in question, when literally construed, are literally 
true or false, and (2) some are literally true.”9  Different versions of moral realism will 
cash out in different ways what is involved in a claim’s being “literally true.”  Some, for 
instance, will point to the truth of a claim being in some sense objective or mind-
independent.  So construed, moral realism clearly possesses the features necessary to 
satisfy the internal accommodation project, as moral language operates in a way that 
seems to presume an existing world of moral facts which speakers are describing when 
                                                 
8 Some authors include constructivism as an irrealist theory, while others maintain that it is an autonomous 
third option.  I will not discuss constructivism in this paper, and so nothing hangs on where it fits vis-à-vis 
the primary distinction.  
9 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, “The Many Moral Realisms” in his Essays on Moral Realism  (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), p. 5. 
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engaging in moral discussion.  Realism’s prospects are less clear, however, with respect 
to satisfying the external accommodation project; it is famously difficult to explain how 
moral facts might exist and, even if they did exist, how we might have access to them.   
 Irrealism, as the name implies, claims that realism is false.  Irrealists have 
traditionally drawn a distinction between descriptive and evaluative language and have 
claimed, contra realism, that moral discourse involves the latter.  Moral claims have 
variably been explained as expressions of emotion or as projections of a speaker’s values 
on an otherwise valueless world.  In either case, moral sentences are not genuine 
assertions and so are not apt for truth or falsity.  Irrealism satisfies the external 
accommodation project because it does not introduce “metaphysically queer”10 entities 
into one’s ontology, which can therefore remain wholly naturalistic.  Irrealism struggles, 
however, to satisfy the internal accommodation project, since it claims that moral 
discourse is not fact-stating and it is unclear, for example, how to make inferences among 
moral claims if those claims are nothing but expressions of emotion or attitude.11  
                                                 
10 The term was made popular in the metaethical literature by J.L. Mackie in his “argument from 
queerness” against moral realism, in his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin, 1977). 
11 This leads to the famous Frege-Geach problem for noncognitivists, a species of irrealist.  While 
noncognitivists give us an account of moral expressions when used in simple predications, it is difficult to 
explain what those predications mean when embedded in more complex contexts.  For instance, the 
following is a valid argument by modus ponens: 
(1) If doing X is wrong, then getting one’s friend to do X is wrong. 
(2) Doing X is wrong. 
Therefore, 
(3) Getting one’s friend to do X is wrong. 
But if noncognitivists translate (2) as “Boo X,” it makes no sense to translate (1) as “If boo X, then getting 
one’s friend boo X,” for one can use the predicate “is wrong” in (1) without concomitantly expressing the 
“boo” attitude.  That is, even one who approves of doing X can agree to (1) since it involves the conditional 
form.  Geach argued that noncognitivists owe us an account in which moral arguments of the kind offered 
above make sense and in which moral predications have the same meaning in both embedded and 
unembedded contexts, so as to avoid the fallacy of equivocation.  See P.T. Geach, “Ascriptivism,” in his 
Logic Matters (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972): pp. 250-5; and “Assertion,” Philosophical Review 74 (1965): pp. 
449-65.   
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 The two closely-related metaethical theories I will examine in this paper—Crispin 
Wright’s theory in Chapter One and Mark Timmons’ theory in Chapter Two—attempt to 
demonstrate that irrealism can satisfy both internal and external accommodation projects.  
They think that a new form of irrealism can succeed where older ones failed because the 
new form includes a minimal conception of truth, which allows an agent to ascribe truth 
or falsity to a moral sentence just in case it meets certain minimal criteria (which, of 
course, they argue that many well-formed moral sentences do).  I will argue that both 
Wright and Timmons fail to accomplish this task.  After examining their theories in 
detail, I will demonstrate that the accounts they provide of moral discourse and practice 
have implications that preclude them from meeting the criteria of internal 
accommodation.   
The pattern of my overall argument will be fairly simple.  Both Wright and 
Timmons assume that if a metaethical theory entails relativism, then that theory fails to 
satisfy the project of internal accommodation.  They reason that it is an integral part both 
of moral language and of our experience as moral agents that moral predicates—‘right’ 
and ‘wrong’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’—are used categorically, not relativistically.  I will 
demonstrate that both of their accounts entail a form of relativism, and so fail on their 
own terms.  I will then, in Chapter Three, introduce a form of moderate metaethical 
relativism that I take to be most congenial to the views of Wright and Timmons, in order 
to explore whether their theories can be saved by admitting that they entail a species of 
relativism that is less radical than the ones they rightly reject.  My attempt at offering a 
friendly amendment fails, however, as the distinction between moderate and extreme 









Crispin Wright has developed a promising framework for situating debates 
regarding realism and irrealism in different domains of discourse by advancing a 
pluralistic notion of minimal truth.12  He employs this notion in the domain of ethics to 
argue (1) that moral realism, conceived as involving a representational mode of 
cognition, is false, and (2) that one can be a moral irrealist, i.e. hold that ethics does not 
involve representational cognition, without thereby sacrificing the integrity of moral 
discourse.13  This chapter will evaluate Wright’s success in arguing for (2).  Honoring the 
‘integrity of moral discourse’ is an internal accommodation project that involves 
vindicating the ordinary use of moral language by licensing such expressions as “It is a 
fact that P” and “It is true that P,” where P is some moral proposition.  Thus, Wright 
intends for his view to stand in contradistinction to other irrealist theories such as 
emotivism, expressivism, and projectivism, which interpret moral sentences as involving 
expressions of emotion, attitude, or inclination, but not truth.   
While there is a significant secondary literature on various aspects of Wright’s 
framework, surprisingly little critical attention has been paid to whether that framework 
can successfully accommodate moral discourse.  In this chapter, I will argue that without 
significant changes, it cannot.  More specifically, I will argue that despite the numerous 
                                                 
12 Cf.  Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).  A collection of 
papers defending and expanding on his view is anthologized in Saving the Differences (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003). 
13 Wright says he wants “a way of casting the anti-realist intuition which is consistent with the integrity of 
moral discourse and argument, and which allows us to take a moral point of view with a clean intellectual 
conscience.”  See his “Truth in Ethics,” in Wright (2003), p. 188. 
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strengths of Wright’s proposal, his conception of truth in ethics faces difficulties in 
properly accounting for an important form of moral conflict.  ‘Moral conflict’, as I use 
the term, refers to an incompatibility between judgments about a moral issue at either the 
personal or interpersonal level.   
First-order moral conflict arises at the personal level when an agent believes 
there is moral reason to endorse two or more mutually incompatible propositions, and 
there is some difficulty in choosing between them.  First-order judgments are best 
conceived as judgments about the content of moral claims—which actions are 
permissible and which are forbidden—and first-order conflict is thus disagreement 
regarding those contents.  Second-order moral conflict, by contrast, involves claims 
about the authority and importance of particular moral standards.  It is just like first-order 
conflict except that the propositions concern, not particular first-order judgments, but 
rather the moral structure that underlies classes of first-order judgments.  For instance, 
while a first-order judgment might say a certain act is morally wrong, a second-order 
judgment will say why that act is wrong according to a particular moral theory or outlook.   
I will argue that the conceptual apparatus Wright deploys to account for first-
order conflict is unable to account for second-order conflict without thereby undermining 
the integrity of moral discourse, and so Wright’s proposal for irrealist minimal truth in 
ethics fails on the terms set out in (2).  In §II below, I will discuss in greater detail the 
two forms of moral conflict.  In §III, I will present Wright’s conceptual framework and 
discuss how he introduces an epistemic conception of vagueness to account for conflict in 
irrealist discourses.  I will demonstrate in §IV how this conception of vagueness 
accommodates much first-order moral conflict.  In §§V and VI, I will explain why 
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Wright’s conception of vagueness nevertheless fails to account for second-order moral 
conflict.  It fails, I will argue, because Wright does not acknowledge the way in which 
second-order judgments arise from different moral discourses, rather than from within a 
single moral discourse.  The only alternative avenue Wright provides for accommodating 
second-order conflict—namely, appealing to ‘intransigent disputes of inclination’—
forces him to endorse unwittingly a form of relativism, thereby undermining the ordinary 
use of moral language and failing to satisfy the project of internal accommodation.   
 
II. A Typology of Moral Conflict 
Disagreement about the significance of persistent moral disagreement is an 
important fault line in the realism/irrealism debate: the realist claims that at least one 
disputant in a moral disagreement must be mistaken, and the irrealist replies that the fact 
of persistent disagreement is itself a reason to doubt the credibility of the realist’s 
agenda.14  The irrealist can, however, grant that much actual moral disagreement does 
involve error on the part of one or another interlocutor—a subject may make a faulty 
inference, or suffer from a lack of imagination, or judge based upon unwarranted 
                                                 
14 Broadly construed, the realist claims that moral facts exist independently of human subjects, and that a 
subject possesses moral knowledge by grasping a moral fact.  Thus, the realist explains nearly every case of 
moral disagreement—except where options may be incommensurable—by attributing a mistake to at least 
one of the disputants in a debate.  If there is a fact of the matter regarding a moral question and two subjects 
disagree on that fact, then one or both may be guilty of something worth describing as a cognitive 
shortcoming, whether it be caused by a logical or perceptual error, a lack of information, or the influence of 
bias.  The irrealist (again, broadly construed) argues that persistent disagreement is itself a reason to be 
skeptical of the existence of independently existing moral facts.  If there were independent moral facts, and 
if humans had reliable access to them (i.e. assuming a non-skeptical account of moral knowledge), then 
subjects’ moral judgments would converge more often than they do.  The irrealist argues that a more 
plausible lesson to take away from the observation of persistent disagreement is that moral judgments are 
inextricably linked to a given culture at a given time or are simply projections of inclination upon a world 
that otherwise contains no moral values.  In either case, then, a moral mistake is attributable only from a 
particular moral viewpoint.  
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prejudices, such that the resulting belief is inconsistent with the subject’s overall belief 
set.  But it is not a priori, says the irrealist, that moral disagreement involves error.   
The more important problem for the realism/irrealism debate arises when 
abstracting from actual disagreement and idealizing the disputants in order to consider 
hypothetical moral disagreement between two equally well-situated subjects.  We might 
classify these subjects as epistemic peers, both of whom possess all the epistemic virtues 
and all the information relevant to making a judgment on the moral issue in question.15  
In the typology that follows, I will grant for Wright’s irrealist position that the subjects 
involved in an interpersonal moral conflict are epistemic peers, and that their judgments 
are still incompatible in the light of full information.16  The construction of this typology 
is a preliminary step to judging whether Wright’s framework (addressed in the following 
section) can successfully account for the two forms of moral conflict.   
As I noted above, first-order conflict arises when an agent believes there is moral 
reason to endorse two or more mutually incompatible propositions and there is some 
difficulty in choosing between them.  Formally, the agent must decide whether to endorse 
P or Q, where P and Q are incompatible, and there seem to be good reasons in favor of 
each.17  The incompatibility involved in first-order conflict becomes apparent often, 
though not always, because of the practical impossibility of concurrently performing the 
actions corresponding to each of the two propositions.   
                                                 
15 I borrow the term “epistemic peer” from Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” 
in John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler, ed., Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006).  Kelly in turn borrows the term from Gary Gutting.  Kelly writes, “Two individuals are 
epistemic peers with respect to some question if and only if they satisfy the following two conditions:  
(i) they are equals with respect to their familiarity with the evidence and arguments which bear on that 
question, and (ii) they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtues such as intelligence, 
thoughtfulness, and freedom from bias” (p. 10).   
16 Likewise, I will grant that the subject experiencing an intrapersonal conflict is in an epistemically ideal 
situation. 
17 In this paper, a “reason for endorsing P” is equivalent to a “consideration in favor of endorsing P.” 
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Consider an example.  I am trying to decide the best way to use an extra $100.  I 
am deliberating between two options: I can either (p) donate the money to a charity 
organization that will use it to help provide for the basic health needs of far-away 
impoverished people or I can (q) invest the money for my child, who will need it to 
finance her education when she comes of age.  There seem to be good reasons in favor of 
both actions, as p would benefit a large number of people and q would constitute a step 
toward fulfilling the special obligations I have to my child.  But if p is formulated simply 
as “Donate $100” and q is formulated as “Invest $100,” there is nothing in the 
formulations themselves to suggest that these actions are incompatible.  
The incompatibility arises when I must include in my deliberation the fact that, 
because I have just $100 to spend, I can only choose one course of action.  The 
propositions I must consider, then, might be formalized in the following way: 
P: For an agent A in circumstance C, where p and q are the morally relevant and 
mutually incompatible options, p is morally better than q, so A ought to (act on or 
endorse) p and not q. 
 
Q: For an agent A in circumstance C, where p and q are the morally relevant and 
mutually incompatible options, q is morally better than p, so A ought to (act on or 
endorse) q and not p.  
 
Upon considering the above formulations, one may wonder why we should not simply 
characterize first-order conflict as involving the choice between “A ought to P” and “It is 
not the case that A ought to P.”  The reason is that first-order conflict may involve more 
than two options, and so formalizing the problem simply as a choice between a 
proposition and its negation will leave out important information, including whether A 
chose to act on one of the stated options at all.  For example, imagine that I consider a 
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third option in addition to the two above: I can (r) donate $100 to a political party whose 
platform I support, which corresponds to  
R: For an agent A in circumstance C, where p and q and r are the morally relevant 
and mutually incompatible options, r is morally better than p or q, so A ought to 
(act on or endorse) r and not p and not q. 
 
If we characterize the first-order conflict here as a choice between “A ought to R” and “It 
is not the case that A ought to R,” there are three options included in the latter proposition 
(namely, P, Q, and abstaining from action), and it is not specified which has been 
selected.   
I add the parenthetical “endorse” to the formulations above because, although 
moral judgments are generally thought to be action-guiding, they need not be action 
entailing.  First-order moral judgments are often employed in simply working out where 
one stands on a particular issue—such as abortion or euthanasia—and not in preparing to 
take a particular course of action.  The relevant propositions in these cases may be 
simpler than the ones discussed above.  For example, the form of the proposition may be 
something like “x is morally wrong,” where ‘x’ picks out a particular practice.  In these 
sorts of first-order conflicts, one may simply be choosing between endorsing a 
proposition and endorsing its negation, where the conflict is a matter of logical 
contradiction as opposed to mere practical incompatibility.  Nevertheless, for the reasons 
given above, I will continue to characterize first-order conflict using the slightly more 
complex notion of incompatibility.  
First-order conflict can be instantiated in at least three distinct ways.  The first 
way is principle-conflict, where an agent must choose to act in accordance with one of 
two moral principles, both of which seem to carry moral weight but which are mutually 
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exclusive in a given case.  For instance, a doctor must decide whether to act from a duty 
of beneficence or a duty of respect for autonomy in a case where performing a beneficial 
medical procedure would contravene a patient’s expressed wishes.   
The second type of first-order conflict is act-conflict, where an agent must choose 
which act best satisfies a given principle or maxim in some circumstance.  The oft-
discussed scene in the novel Sophie’s Choice18 is a striking example of this type of 
conflict.  A mother must decide which of her two children will be sent to a Nazi gas 
chamber, and a guard will kill both children if she makes no decision.  In a forced choice 
of this kind, it is not clear which option is least morally repugnant and thus which is most 
in concert with a maxim of maternal love.19       
The third type of first-order conflict is description-conflict, which arises when one 
is trying to decide how best to describe an act or character with reference to some 
particular set of features.  Imagine that you are trying to decide whether some person—
call her Jane—exemplifies the virtue of courage.20  In order to do so, you must canvass a 
complex web of considerations, where each consideration may be conceived as a 
continuum along which Jane’s set of actions falls.  For instance, courage depends upon 
the danger of the circumstances in which Jane is operating, her knowledge of that danger, 
her degree of mental fortitude, and the value of the cause for which she is acting.  The 
circumstances can be more or less dangerous, her knowledge of the danger can be more 
                                                 
18 William Styron, Sophie’s Choice (New York: Bantam Books, 1980). 
19 This instance of act-conflict may be classified as a moral dilemma, where there is not simply moral 
reason to perform each of two (or more) mutually exclusive acts, but there is moral obligation to do so, 
such that the agent seems condemned to moral failure regardless of which act is chosen.  A similar dilemma 
can be constructed for principle-conflict.  Rarely is either type of conflict so serious, but the most difficult 
cases are the most important, for they test our pre-theoretic judgments regarding whether an agent is 
necessarily guilty of a mistake if she chooses, for instance, P as opposed to Q or R. 
20 Russ Shafer-Landau uses a similar example in a different context.  See his “Ethical Disagreement, 
Ethical Objectivism, and Moral Indeterminacy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, No. 2 
(June 1994), p. 333. 
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or less complete, and so on.  Where Jane falls along each of these rough metrics will 
determine whether you describe her as ‘courageous’, and you may have good reasons 
both for judging Jane courageous and for judging her to be lacking courage, depending 
on how much weight you assign to each category.21   
All three types of intrapersonal first-order conflict have clear interpersonal 
analogues.  Two agents can conflict in judgment regarding which moral principle should 
take precedence in a given case, which act best instantiates a particular principle in some 
circumstance, and which, if any, moral predicate ought to be ascribed to an act or 
character based upon which criteria are judged most important.  
Second-order conflict is formalized just like first-order conflict, though it appears 
most often at the interpersonal level: an agent A endorses P, an agent B endorses Q, P 
and Q are incompatible in circumstance C, and A and B each seem to have good reasons 
for their respective endorsements.  For second-order judgments, however, P is not a 
proposition about the content of a moral claim that determines whether a single act, 
principle, or assessment is right or wrong.  Rather, P is a proposition about the moral 
structure that underlies claims about acts, principles, and assessments; it is a proposition 
                                                 
21 I can foresee two complaints about description-conflict.  First, it might be viewed simply as a variant of 
principle-conflict, as one’s ascription of the predicate ‘courageous’ depends on which metric or ‘principle’ 
is judged most important in a given case.  I think this is correct.  Second, description-conflict fits less neatly 
into the formalization of first-order conflict than do principle- and act-conflicts, because in the former case 
you do not seem forced in every situation to choose one proposition to the exclusion of its negation.  That 
is, you may not be required to describe Jane as courageous or not courageous, but perhaps she is ‘fairly 
courageous’.  Or if, for instance, the cause for which she is acting is not valuable but her actions satisfy the 
other relevant criteria, you could describe her as ‘brave’, ‘fearless’, or even ‘foolhardy’.   
But these responses would be changing the subject, for the original question was simply, “Is Jane 
courageous?”  Modifying the original predicate or ascribing an alternative predicate is tantamount to 
answering “No.”  I think the temptation to believe that there is an option to modify the predicate is a 
reaction to the real difference between description-conflict and principle- and act-conflicts: the latter two 
types of first-order judgment involve practical reasoning about what to do, whereas the former type 
involves assessment of what has already been done.  Thus, even though I grant the first point above 
concerning the similarity between principle- and description-conflict, the second point regarding the 
asymmetry between practical reasoning and subsequent assessment of action seems distinctive enough to 
warrant identifying description-conflict as a third type of first-order conflict.   
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about what makes them right or wrong, obligatory or forbidden.  Thus, second-order 
conflicts are clashes between different points of view about what matters morally and 
about which moral outlook or standards we have most reason to endorse.     
Second-order judgments correspond to what may be considered a restricted type 
of metaethical sentence—namely, the type that contains normative commitments—and 
therefore are not the type that offers an account of what we are doing when we 
moralize.22  Hence, by second-order judgments I do not mean theories like emotivism, 
expressivism, or error theory.  Rather, I mean theories like consequentialism, Kantianism, 
contractualism, constructivism, and virtue theory, all of which offer an account of basic 
moral terms.  Second-order judgments correspond to the following schema: 
 ⁪∀x (Mx↔Dx) 
 
where ‘Mx’ is a moral formula and ‘Dx’ is a descriptive formula.23  For instance, this 
schema applied to a standard form of Kantian ethics would read 
⁪∀x (x is permissible ↔ x passes the test of the Categorical Imperative as a 
          suitably formulated maxim) 
 
and a form of act-utilitarianism would read 
 ⁪∀x (x is right ↔ x maximizes preference satisfaction). 
Conflicts arise between different second-order judgments because the accounts they offer 
of basic moral terms are, at the foundational level, incompatible.  That is to say, while 
proponents of any two theories may converge on a wide number of first-order judgments, 
the starting points and patterns of reasoning they use to reach those judgments differ, 
often in dramatic ways.  For instance, a Kantian, a consequentialist, and a fundamentalist 
                                                 
22 Cf.  James Dreier, “Metaethics and Normative Commitment,” Philosophical Issues 12: A Supplement to 
Nous (2002): pp. 241-63. 
23 I am indebted to Dreier’s paper for this characterization.  Ibid., pp. 244-5. 
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Christian may all agree that a certain social policy is morally good, but they will explain 
the features that make it good in very different ways—the Kantian would explain how it 
fosters the treatment of people as ends in themselves, the consequentialist would appeal 
to how it maximizes well-being, and the fundamentalist Christian would show how it is 
in concert with the demands of divine authority.   
It is clear from this example, then, that people can agree at the first-order level 
while disagreeing at the second-order level.  Likewise, people can agree at the second-
order level while disagreeing at the first order level.  Two liberals may, for instance, 
disagree over the extent to which liberal principles of justice ought to be exercised in the 
international domain and among illiberal peoples.  This sort of variance in judgment 
within any shared moral outlook is ostensibly the cause of much first-order conflict. 
The basic differences between second-order positions become apparent when 
certain first-order judgments hinge upon the definition of fundamental terms and when 
proponents of different second-order judgments discuss issues of casuistry.  It is this type 
of moral conflict that Wright cannot accommodate without thereby jeopardizing the 
integrity of moral discourse he hopes to preserve.  In the following section, I will 
reconstruct Wright’s conceptual framework and then discuss how he handles moral 
conflict. 
 
III. Minimal Truth and Evidential Constraint 
 Wright argues that realism does not have a monopoly on the concept of truth, and 
that by viewing ethics as a truth-apt irrealist discourse, we can avoid the metaphysical 
and epistemological commitments of moral realism while concurrently sidestepping the 
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flaws that plague alternative irrealist theories.  Wright endorses a minimalist conception 
of truth, based upon the Disquotational Scheme (DS): 
‘p’ is true if and only if p, 
whereby asserting a proposition is equivalent to presenting it as true.   
In addition to being governed by the DS, a truth predicate must satisfy the 
‘platitudes of truth’, several of which are as follows: 
To assert is to present as true; 
To every truth-apt content corresponds a truth-apt negation; 
A true proposition ‘corresponds to the facts’;  
Truth and justification are distinct; 
Truth is absolute, timeless, and stable.24
 
A truth predicate can be defined within any discourse that is assertoric, and a discourse 
that admits sentences meeting these simple criteria for truth is truth-apt.  A discourse is 
assertoric if the sentences constitutive of the discourse are subject to both syntactical and 
disciplinary constraints.  Relevant rules of syntax include: a truth predicate must be 
suitable for embedding within propositional attitudes, the conditional, negation, and so 
on.  A discourse exhibits discipline when its sentences are governed by common 
standards of warrant or appropriateness internal to that discourse.  These standards of 
warrant will in turn be determined by some minimal threshold of convergence on how 
predicates ought to be used, e.g. in what circumstances and in reference to what action 
the predicate ‘is forbidden’ applies (and not just in which contexts the predicate fits 
grammatically).25   
                                                 
24 Wright (2003), “On Being in a Quandary,” p. 454. 
25 From this brief summary, it is clear that Wright’s approach is influenced by the later Wittgenstein’s 
conception of “meaning as use,” whereby the meaning of a sentence consists in the speaker’s use of that 
sentence in the appropriate context, in concert with the accepted rules for constructing a sentence in a 
particular discourse.  (See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe 
and R. Rhees.  Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1953, especially §43 and §304.)  But, as indicated by the 
addition of the platitudes to the DS (especially the platitude that “truth and justification are distinct”), 
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The notion of discipline is crucial both to Wright’s theory and to my objections 
against it, so it will be worthwhile to pause here and offer a few more textual clues to 
flesh out what the concept involves.  Wright explains, “Moral discourse is disciplined to a 
very great degree.  Acceptable moral opinion is not just a matter of what feels 
comfortable, but has to survive appraisal by quite refined and complicated standards.”26  
Particular moral judgments are warranted, then, by virtue of their being in concert with or 
following from these refined moral standards.  In another place, Wright relates the 
discipline governing discourse about moral judgments to the fact that “there is both an 
enormous degree of convergence about them within cultures and a very considerable 
degree across cultures.”27  And earlier, he offers this test for minimal truth-aptitude: “A 
class of statements is apt to be true only if there would be a tendency, in suitable 
circumstances, for competent subjects to agree on the truth, or falsity, of members in that 
class.”28  So, discipline involves norms or standards governing warranted assertibility 
that effectively ensure a high degree of agreement on truth-value judgments regarding the 
constitutive sentences of any particular discourse.  Problems become apparent concerning 
the connection between minimal truth and agreement, I will argue in §V below, when we 
pay closer attention to the ways in which discipline operates within particular moral 
standards, and fails to operate between or among moral standards.          
If truth is understood in the way sketched above, then all sorts of discourses are 
truth-apt, including those like judgments about comedy—Wright’s favorite example—
                                                                                                                                                 
Wright’s account diverges from a species of Wittgenstein-inspired deflationism about truth.  Wright argues 
that truth is a ‘substantial’ property, for the platitudes define truth in such a way that ‘true’ is potentially 
extensionally divergent from ‘warrantedly assertible’.           
26 Wright (2003), “Truth in Ethics,” p. 186. 
27 Wright (1992), p. 89. 
28 Ibid., p. 88. 
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which we often think of as trafficking in opinions or subjective tastes rather than truth.  
This result exemplifies Wright’s recommendation that we should admit a plurality of 
ways in which a proposition can be thought of as true, for there is “no discourse invariant 
thing in which truth consists.”29  This point is a bit slippery, but its meaning is simply 
this: truth is not ambiguous in the sense that it means different things in different 
discourses, for the truth platitudes define what it means for a proposition to be true across 
all discourses.  Rather, truth admits of variable realization in different domains; it is what 
constitutes truth in different discourses that varies.   
A defining feature of minimally truth-apt irrealist discourses is evidential 
constraint, which holds that truth is knowable in principle.  More formally, a discourse is 
evidentially constrained if, for any proposition P,  
 P→◊KP 
 
where ‘K’ is the knowledge operator and the possibility operator is interpreted as 
practical possibility or feasibility.  For example, according to the irrealist, the truth of a 
moral proposition does not outstrip humans’ capacity to know it, for its truth depends, in 
an important sense, on humans and their dispositions, ways of using language, and so on. 
While evidential constraint is a necessary condition for a discourse to count as 
minimally truth-apt, it is not necessary for truth-aptness in general.  Realist discourses, 
for instance, are evidentially unconstrained and are thus open to robust interpretations of 
the correspondence platitude.  Propositions in realist discourses, such as physics and 
chemistry, have truth values that often lie beyond our ability to know them; their truth or 
falsity, in most cases, does not even depend on the existence of humans or their epistemic 
                                                 
29 Wright (2003), “Truth in Ethics, p. 190. 
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capacities.  In this way, we can think of a true proposition in a realist discourse as 
representing the way the world is in itself.  
If we think of truth as a matter of correct representation of the world as it is 
independent of humans, then we must attribute to realist discourses a constraint over and 
above the platitudes of truth—what Wright calls cognitive command.  A discourse 
displays cognitive command if and only if  
It is a priori that differences of opinion formulated within [that] discourse, unless 
excusable as a result of vagueness in a disputed statement, or in the standards of 
acceptability, or variation in personal evidence thresholds, so to speak, will 
involve something which may properly be regarded as a cognitive shortcoming.30
 
Imagine a pair of devices—say, cameras—whose purpose it is to represent states of 
affairs independent of human cognition.  If their outputs—in this case, pictures—are 
mutually incompatible, then we must attribute that incompatibility to some failure of 
either one or both of the devices.  Likewise, says Wright, if two agents’ beliefs are 
products of representational cognition and those beliefs are incompatible, at least one of 
the agents is guilty of a cognitive shortcoming.  But this is a feature of realist discourses 
that, Wright contends, ethics does not share, for moral disagreement need not necessarily 
involve cognitive shortcoming. 
 It seems reasonable to challenge Wright at this point, for he leaves open the 
question of how truth-values ought to be assigned when moral propositions are 
incompatible.  How can a discourse be minimally truth-apt and evidentially constrained, 
yet lack cognitive command?31  If moral discourse is truth-apt and two agents disagree 
                                                 
30 Wright (1992), p. 144. 
31 This concern is also raised by Stewart Shapiro and William Taschek, “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and 
Cognitive Command,” Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996):  pp. 74-88.  A similar concern is raised by 
Timothy Williamson, “A Critical Study of Truth and Objectivity,” International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies 30, No. 1, (1994): pp. 130-144.    
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about a moral proposition, then it seems that at least one of the agents holds a moral 
belief that is false.  Otherwise, we would have to admit the possibility that, where P and 
Q are incompatible, they can nevertheless both be true, which is absurd.32  What is more, 
because moral discourse is evidentially constrained, the agent who is wrong holds a false 
moral belief while the correct belief is knowable.  The fact that the potential solution to 
the disagreement is knowable, and yet the agent does not know it, suffices to demonstrate 
that the agent suffers from a cognitive shortcoming.  And if it is a priori that 
disagreement involves a cognitive shortcoming, then cognitive command holds.  Clearly, 
if this line of reasoning is sound, Wright’s framework is undermined; if moral discourse 
involves cognitive command, then his brand of irrealism never gets off the ground.  
 Wright responds to this objection in “On Being in a Quandary,”33 where he seeks 
to defend his view that, regarding moral discourse, “genuinely conflicting opinions about 
a truth-evaluable claim may each be unimprovable and may involve no misrepresentation 
of any further fact.”34  He takes the nub of the issue to be whether we can vindicate the 
pre-theoretic judgment that ‘disputes of inclination’, which are merely minimally truth-
apt, differ from ‘disputes of fact’ where, if judgments are incompatible, at least one of the 
disputants holds a false belief.  Disputes of inclination might involve the following sorts 
of claims: 
That snails are delicious 
That cockroaches are disgusting 
That marital infidelity is alright provided nobody gets hurt 
                                                 
32 This worry is motivated in part by the assumption that all propositions in minimally truth-apt discourses 
are either true or false; but the assumption of bivalence in such contexts, we will see, is one that Wright 
will reject in response to this problem. 
33  Crispin Wright, “On Being in a Quandary: Relativism, Vagueness, Logical Revisionism,” Mind 110 
(2001), pp. 45-98.  Reprinted in Wright (2003): 443-509.  Page references in this paper are to the latter 
citation. 
34 Ibid., p. 453. 
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That a Pacific sunset trumps any Impressionistic canvas.35
 
It is important to note that Wright classifies claims about moral permissibility among 
others that are generally thought to be matters of taste.   
To preserve the possibility that a discourse may be minimally truth-apt and 
display evidential constraint without also exhibiting cognitive command, Wright 
proposes a ‘quandary view’, which employs an epistemic conception of vagueness to 
argue that in disputes of inclination it may be indeterminate whether P or Q is true.  But 
indeterminacy is not, so to speak, a determinate status, whereby we may ascribe to P or Q 
a third value—namely, ‘I’, or indeterminate.  Wright explains, 
Indeterminacy will be initially manifest not in (relatively confident) verdicts of 
indeterminacy but in (hesitant) differences of opinion (either between subjects at a 
given time or within a single subject’s opinions at different times) about a polar 
verdict, which we have no idea how to settle—and which, therefore, we do not 
recognize as wrong.36  
      
Epistemic conceptions of indeterminacy view vagueness as a type of ignorance, such that 
we know neither that a given borderline statement is true nor that it is false.37  Epistemic 
indeterminacy can preclude the move from minimal truth-aptness and evidential 
constraint to cognitive command by placing a thinker in a quandary.  Wright stipulates: 
A proposition P presents a quandary for a thinker T just when the following 
conditions are met: 
(i) T does not know whether or not P. 
(ii) T does not know any way of knowing whether or not P. 
(iii) T does not know that there is any way of knowing whether or not P. 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 445. 
36 Ibid., p. 476. 
37 Some proponents of this view—called ‘Epistemicists’—maintain that vague predicates have sharp 
boundaries, and that we are simply ignorant of their truth-value.  They argue that there is an exact point at 
which, for instance, I grow from ‘short’ to ‘tall’, only we cannot identify it.  The clearest defenses of this 
view are Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (London: Routledge, 1994) and Roy Sorensen, Blindspots 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).  Williamson and Sorensen treat bivalence as a desideratum that counts in 
favor of treating vague predicates as sharply defined.  
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(iv) T does not know that it is (metaphysically) possible to know whether or not 
P.38
 
The joint satisfaction of these conditions would seem to entail a fifth condition—
(v) T knows that it is impossible to know whether or not P—but Wright intends a 
quandary to be such a deep case of ignorance that T has no basis for claiming (v).  Wright 
employs this characterization to argue that intuitionistic logic should supplant classical 
logic when a vague proposition places a thinker in a quandary.  When conditions (i)-(iv) 
are met, a thinker is not warranted in affirming that the law of excluded middle (LEM) 
applies to evidentially constrained discourses.  That is, since T does not know that there 
is any way of knowing whether P or Q, T can neither affirm nor deny that the discourse is 
evidentially constrained.39  T cannot know the truth-value of the disjunction  
 (◊KP v ◊K~P). 
But if a compelling case can be made that the discourse is in fact evidentially constrained, 
and LEM implies that such a fact cannot be known, then, Wright argues, we have no 
warrant for accepting LEM.40   
                                                 
38 Wright (2003), “On Being in a Quandary,” p. 504. 
39 Cf. Ibid., p. 480. 
40 Notice that this conclusion differs from the one reached by the following line of reasoning (which I owe 
to John Nolt), which would categorically rule out LEM in the presence of quandary and evidential 
constraint: 
 
(1) ~◊K(◊KP ∨ ◊K~P) 
from which by this instance of evidential constraint: 
 (2) (◊KP ∨ ◊K~P) → ◊K(◊KP ∨ ◊K~P) 
  and modus tollens we obtain: 
 (3)  ~(◊KP ∨ ◊K~P) 
But LEM, i.e, 
 (4) P ∨ ~P 
implies by evidential constraint: 
 (5) ◊KP ∨ ◊K~P 
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For instance, it is clear that the discourse regarding the instantiation of color 
properties is evidentially constrained, for color is, by the nature of the concept, detectable 
by an adequately situated subject with normal visual capacities.  The borderline case 
causes a quandary and LEM holds that either the color is, say, red and not purple or 
purple and not red, and evidential constraint holds that it is feasible to know which is 
true.  But since T is in a quandary, T has no warrant for accepting the ramifications of 
LEM under evidential constraint.  According to Wright, “There will always be a case for 
suspension of classical logic wherever locally forceful grounds for evidential constraint 
combine with the possibility of quandary.”41  Since quandaries arise in evidentially 
constrained discourses, they “enforce agnosticism about principles—like bivalence—
which if they could be assumed to hold, would ensure that there was a ‘fact of the 
matter’, about which we would merely be ignorant.  It is a matter, if you like, of lack of 
warrant to believe in a fact of the matter, rather than a reason to deny one.”42  When there 
is disagreement regarding a vague predicate, we cannot attribute error to one of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
which contradicts 3. 
41 Wright (2003), “On Being in a Quandary,” p. 486.  Notice that Wright’s epistemic account of vagueness 
differs from the Epistemicist’s account (see note 37), not by denying the Epistemicist’s claim that vague 
predicates have determinate boundaries, but rather by denying that there are sufficient grounds to accept 
such a claim.  Notice also, however, that Wright’s inference from the perceived lack of warrant for LEM to 
the conclusion that the appropriate logic is intuitionistic is an odd one.  Even if he is correct in arguing that 
the possibility of a quandary forces one to adopt a non-classical logic, there are non-classical alternatives 
that would arguably be more appropriate than intuitionistic logic in this context.  One obvious alternative 
would be a three-valued logic in which a proposition could be T, F, or I.  While intuitionistic logic may 
avoid some of the problems of classical logic with respect to the issues in question, it nevertheless fails to 
incorporate fully the original judgment that there is a significant role for the notion of indeterminacy to 
play.  If Wright is intent on employing the concept of vagueness, then a fuzzy logic, not an intuitionistic 
logic, is the most natural alternative.  Both a multi-valued logic and a fuzzy logic would invalidate LEM.  
(See John Nolt, Logics. Belmont: Wadsworth, 1997, Part V: Non-classical Logics.)  Despite Wright’s 
curious decision to adopt intuitionistic logic over these two alternatives, since my purpose in this chapter is 
to examine the implications of Wright’s view as it is, I will grant rather than challenge his choice of 
intuitionistic logic.    
42 Ibid., p. 498. 
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disputants, for to do so in the presence of evidential constraint would require that we 
identify the guilty party, and this is precisely what a quandary precludes us from doing.43  
There are a number of objections one could raise regarding Wright’s introduction 
of quandaries to explain vague predicates and disagreement.44  My project, however, is to 
determine whether Wright’s account is capable of satisfying the two criteria for success 
he established at the outset with regard to moral discourse: a framework of minimal truth 
should both (1) honor the irrealist intuition and (2) preserve the integrity of moral 
discourse.  After delineating the two types of quandary, I will demonstrate that the notion 
of a quandary can be employed to explain several types of first-order conflict, but, when 
this notion is applied to second-order conflict, failure of (2) is the result.   
 
IV. Quandary and First-Order Conflict 
Wright discusses two types of quandary that are germane to discussions of moral 
conflict: (a) intransigent disputes of inclination, e.g. the dispute over whether 
cockroaches are disgusting, and (b) borderline cases of vague expressions, e.g. the 
dispute over whether a given swatch of color is red or purple.45  It is not immediately 
obvious to what degree these two types of quandary are interrelated.  Clearly, a dispute 
over whether cockroaches are disgusting is not motivated by vagueness in the predicate 
                                                 
43 This is an instance in which a multi-valued logic might be superior to intuitionistic logic (see note 41).  
Since evidential constraint only applies when a proposition’s truth-value is either T or F, it would not be 
operative in a situation where we could give it a determinate value, I.  In that case, we could say that both P 
and Q are incorrect, thereby avoiding a quandary.  This sort of approach might be thought preferable in 
cases regarding, say, abortion, where the various borderline considerations make the proposition, “Abortion 
is morally forbidden,” generally indeterminate, and not true or false.  
44 For an Epistemicist argument against Wright’s application of intuitionistic logic to vague predicates, see 
Sven Rosenkranz, “Wright on Vagueness and Agnosticism,” Mind, 112 (July 2003): pp. 447-63.  Wright’s 
response, “Rosenkranz on Quandary, Vagueness, and Intuitionism,” is contained in the same issue, pp. 465-
74.  
45 Wright’s terminology is a bit confusing here.  Both types of quandary are included in the larger category 
of ‘disputes of inclination’, as contrasted with ‘disputes of fact’.   
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‘is disgusting’; both disputants likely have the same understanding of what warrants a 
judgment of ‘disgusting’, just antipodal opinions about whether cockroaches fit the bill.  
On the other hand, it seems that diverging inclinations can sometimes influence on which 
side of a borderline case a disputant’s judgment falls, so that the distinction between the 
two types of quandary is less than absolute.46   
With these interconnections between the two types of quandary in mind, let us 
examine how the notion of a quandary may be applied to the three categories of first-
order conflict.  There is reason to believe that certain instances of moral description-
conflict may be interpreted as quandaries motivated by borderline disputes over vague 
predicates.  Compare borderline-case predications of color to the discussion of 
description-conflict above, which examined the complex web of considerations that must 
be canvassed before deciding whether Jane should be described as ‘courageous’.  With 
some borderline-case predications of ‘red’, for instance, it is permissible to judge a 
swatch of color either ‘red’ or ‘purple’.  But there are some instantiations of red which 
are paradigmatic, such that nearly everyone converges in judging them ‘red’, and if a 
subject answers ‘purple’ we would respond that she is simply confused as to how the 
predicates ‘red’ and ‘purple’ are used.  Likewise, there are paradigmatic cases of courage, 
where if a subject describes a given act as ‘not courageous’, we respond that she simply 
                                                 
46 Take, for instance, a borderline case in which two subjects, A and B, must judge whether a given person, 
X, is tall.  If A is five feet tall, B is six feet tall, and X is five-and-a-half feet tall, A and B may disagree 
about which predicate—‘is tall’ or ‘is short’—best describes X.  A may be more inclined to describe X as 
tall because X is significantly taller than A, and B may be more inclined to describe X as short because X is 
significantly shorter than B.  In this case it is not obvious that either A or B must be in error.  If this is 
correct, individuals’ inclinations may play a role in how borderline cases are decided.  The quandary-
producing potential of disputes of inclination seems to be realized in those cases where (1) certain facts 
particular to each of two judges lead them to diverge in judgment and (2) those facts fall among some 
permissible range of variation.  Those judgment-influencing facts about a person that fall outside the 
permissible range of facts may be biases, prejudices, and so on.  Notice, though, how borderline predicates 
may be involved in determining disputes of inclination: one must decide whether some fact about a judge 
leads to an unwarranted judgment, and a fact near the outer range of permissible facts will either necessitate 
a judgment on a borderline case or lead to a quandary.   
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doesn’t understand how the concept ‘courage’ is used.  As my above discussion 
suggested, there are also borderline cases of courage where, if Jane’s action satisfies with 
varying success the several constituents of ‘courage’—the degree of danger of her 
circumstances, her knowledge of that danger, and so on—it may be indeterminate 
whether the predicate applies.47  
Cases of act-conflict are likewise open to interpretation as quandaries motivated 
by borderline disputes over vague predicates.  Act-conflict arises because practical 
principles themselves are indeterminate, or, perhaps, under-determinate.48  Since 
practical principles are not algorithmic, judgment is always required to determine what 
act is most in the spirit of a given principle in a particular situation.  When deliberation 
does not reveal one act to carry more moral weight than another, which act should be 
chosen (based on multiple criteria) is indeterminate and an agent may be forced into a 
quandary.   
Principle-conflict can be interpreted in two ways, one of which is much like 
decision- and act-conflicts, the other of which is quite different and more difficult to 
accommodate.  Call the easy type ‘principle1-conflict’ and the difficult type ‘principle2-
conflict’.  Both types of principle-conflict arise when two or more moral principles are 
contingently incompatible with one another.  When principle1-conflict is interpreted as an 
                                                 
47 The multiple constituents of ‘courage’ exemplify a notable difference between moral predicates and 
commonly accepted vague predicates such as ‘red’ and ‘tall’.  As Russ Shafer-Landau notes (in 
“Vagueness, Borderline Cases, and Moral Realism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 32, No. 1, January 
1995, p. 84.), the instantiation of the latter type is “determined by a sufficiently large (or small) presence of 
discrete, addable units of some constitutive property”—gradations of color in the first case and variations in 
height in the second.  Moral predicates, by contrast, are multi-dimensional because their instantiation 
depends on the satisfaction of a number of related but distinct constituent predicates, e.g. ‘is dangerous’, ‘is 
aware of the danger’, ‘displays mental fortitude’, and so on.  Since moral predicates admit of degrees—an 
act may be more or less courageous—they are also instantiated by discrete, addable units, only these units 
differ with each constitutive metric.   
48 Cf. Onora O’Neill, “Principles, Practical Judgment, and Institutions,” in Bounds of Justice (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 50-64. 
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intrapersonal borderline case, the various considerations that lead an agent to endorse 
each principle are so evenly matched that it is indeterminate which principle should be 
operative in a particular situation.  The agent may in this manner be forced into a 
quandary.  Before examining principle2-conflict, it is important to note how well 
description-conflict, act-conflict, and principle1-conflict all fit in Wright’s framework.   
The multiple constitutive criteria of a moral49 predicate can be interpreted as the 
standards of warranted assertibility for that predicate, so that only when those 
constituents are satisfied can the predicate be true of some act, description, or principle.  
Because many moral predicates are in this way governed by norms of assertibility, much 
first-order moral discourse exhibits discipline.  We know from observation that first-order 
moral discourse is also constrained by simple syntactical rules.  A discourse that is 
constrained by rules of syntax and discipline is assertoric, and thus is truth-apt.  It 
appears that, if we grant Wright’s argument regarding evidential constraint in irrealist 
discourses, the necessarily brief discussion above gives us reason to believe that some 
discourse regarding description-, act-, and principle1-judgments is minimally truth-apt in 
just the way Wright intends.  We can speak of a moral predicate being ‘true’ of 
something without also committing ourselves to holding that in a moral dispute, at least 
one of the disputants must be wrong.  But this still leaves the question of whether 
discourse regarding principle2-judgments and discourse regarding second-order 
judgments are also minimally truth-apt.  Here, the case becomes more difficult.                               
 Interpreted as a species of interpersonal case, principle-conflict can be unlike 
indeterminate borderline cases.  Where agent A endorses P and agent B endorses Q, 
                                                 
49 Here, I take ‘moral’ to refer only to the first-order description-, act-, and principle1-judgments discussed 
above. 
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much depends on the reasons for each one’s endorsement.  The interpersonal case can, of 
course, be analogous to the personal case just outlined—both agents may see nearly equal 
moral reason for endorsing each contingently incompatible principle, so that it is 
indeterminate which is best.  On this characterization, though, both agents may be value 
pluralists who, as it were, view as roughly on a par the relative weights of agent-neutral, 
agent-relative, and prudential reasons, along with deontic and consequentialist 
considerations.   
Or, what is probably more often the case, neither agent endorses a determinate or 
readily identifiable second-order theory.  This may be the case for many people outside 
of philosophy departments and organized religions.  As T.M. Scanlon notes, “People’s 
understanding of the moral standards they recognize is generally inchoate, and their 
conception of the basis of the authority of these principles may be even less clear.”50  
Many people within a given society may accept some variant of “commonsense morality” 
and endorse various moral “rules of thumb,” in which case we may think of them as 
sharing a roughly similar moral outlook.  Nevertheless, their lack of understanding with 
respect to the details of that outlook serves as an obstacle to attributing clear second-order 
judgments to them, since it is much more likely that, upon reflection, they would find 
inconsistencies among the second-order judgments that undergird their moral view, or 
that their endorsement of a particular second-order judgment has first-order implications 
that they find unpalatable.  I will say more about the problem of determining how first-
order judgments work in §V below.   
Returning to my larger point, the situation changes if each agent consciously 
subscribes to a specific theory of how moral values are derived and prioritized.  This 
                                                 
50 T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other.  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 350.  
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gives rise to principle2-conflict.  A and B may endorse different first-order principles 
based upon different second-order principles, whereby more weight is assigned to one 
first-order principle because it is held by a second-order principle to be more 
fundamentally constitutive of the good.  Recall the example of the doctor who must 
decide whether to perform a beneficial operation at the cost of overriding a patient’s 
autonomy.  If the doctor endorses consequentialist practical reasoning, she may choose to 
proceed with the operation; it is already stipulated that the patient places a higher value 
on autonomy.  This is the sort of principle2-conflict that occasions the most difficult 
questions of moral disagreement.51  Principle2-conflict caused by second-order conflict 
most resembles an intransigent dispute of inclination, as one disputant places superior 
value on a principle “with which the other could not be brought to sympathize.”52  A 
third-party to this dispute faces a quandary if she sees reasons to endorse each principle 
based upon the weight of their corresponding second-order judgments, but cannot 
determine which of these judgments is morally better.   
Discourses concerning act-, description-, and principle1-judgments may be 
thought to be truth-apt because they exhibit discipline, as each supposes a common set of 
assumptions among interlocutors that effectively limits the range of acceptable answers 
to any moral question.  This is most obvious in act-judgments, where the practical 
principle is already selected and the only problem lies in determining how best to 
instantiate it.  Description-judgments are, to a large degree, conceptual matters, as the 
                                                 
51 It may seem as though this is not a case of principle2-conflict, because the patient may place a higher 
value on autonomy simply because the ramifications for placing a higher value on beneficence or utility 
would, in this case, turn out badly for her.  To deal with this problem, we could stipulate that the patient 
consistently ranks autonomy higher than beneficence or utility in her lexical ordering of values, and that 
she does so because she thinks considerations of autonomy are simply more morally important.   
52 Wright (2003), “On Being in a Quandary,” p. 445. 
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concept ‘courage’, for instance, consists of several widely agreed-upon features; the 
potential for dispute lies in the varying weights one might assign to each of these 
constitutive features.  Finally, principle1-judgments assume a value pluralism (or a shared 
“commonsense” morality) which, although it admits a wider range of permissible 
answers than do either of the first two types of first-order judgment, nevertheless assumes 
that adherence to a particular conception of the good will not preclude some increase in a 
different category of value from altering one’s judgment.  These limitations on the range 
of acceptable answers ensure convergence on a significant percentage of judgments (a 
prerequisite for discipline) and make it likely that cases of incompatible judgments can be 
attributed to vagueness, because acceptable answers are so close to one another that an 
agent may be unable to say which is true.         
 
V. Quandary and Second-Order Conflict 
Second-order judgments concern what matters morally and why; second-order 
conflict, therefore, represents a disagreement over the moral structure that underlies 
classes of first-order judgments.  Unlike many first-order discourses, it is not obvious that 
discourses concerning second-order judgments (a category that includes both principle2-
judgments and second-order judgments) suppose a common set of assumptions, which 
might serve to limit the range of acceptable answers, for various definitions of 
fundamental moral terms—‘good’, ‘wrong’, ‘obligatory’, ‘permissible’—diverge widely 
in content.  Certainly, there is a range of acceptable definitions of fundamental moral 
terms to the same extent that there is a range of theories that can legitimately be called 
“moral.”  But in judging which theory is true, that choice is often marked, not by how 
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similar the theories are owing to the potential vagueness of their central claims, but rather 
by how different they are owing to the alternative accounts they provide of what moral 
standards we have most reason to endorse.   
The incompatibility of these accounts becomes apparent in principle2-conflicts.  
For example, a Kantian may find it morally reprehensible to lie for the sake of preventing 
some minor injury to a loved one, while a consequentialist may consider the Kantian 
morally blind to ignore the fact that the lie would (let’s say) cause no harm but refraining 
from lying would lead to avoidable injury.  Meanwhile, the proponent of a Bernard 
Williams-type view would charge both the Kantian and the consequentialist with 
corruption for failing to consider the moral significance of relationships with loved ones 
and their importance to one’s identity.53  All of the principle2-judgments in this example 
are guided by different second-order judgments about what is morally most important.  
The diversity of second-order judgments becomes even more apparent when we consider 
a wider range of ethical theories—Buddhist ethics, Christian ethics, the ethics of Deep 
Ecology, Nietzschean ethics—where each theory displays the same ostensibly assertoric 
features that, when combined with evidential constraint, give rise to minimal truth-
aptitude.  
One of the primary reasons Wright characterizes ethics as a minimally truth-apt 
discourse is to allow agents to be warranted in making moral claims even in the face of 
disagreement.  Treating ethics as a more or less unified discourse, however, conceals the 
plurality of ways in which ethical assertions may be warranted with respect to different 
theories.  That is, considering ethics as a single discipline elides the most important 
                                                 
53 Cf. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), among his other 
works.  
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problem: how to adjudicate between claims of competing theories which take 
divergently-defined concepts as starting points.  If ‘moral discourse’ should instead be 
interpreted as ‘moral discourses’, where each discourse is governed by its own local 
norms of assertibility, we should be concerned that a proposition might be warranted only 
with regard to the norms internal to a particular discourse.  If we accept that some first-
order discourse is minimally truth-apt, it should be uncontroversial to accept that some 
particular second-order discourses are also minimally truth-apt, for most moral theories 
operate by way of highly-refined standards of assertibility, and those standards all but 
ensure convergence on a wide range of judgments.  
Nevertheless, if minimal truth-aptitude exists only internal to various moral 
discourses, then neither discourse about second-order judgments nor discourse containing 
principle2-conflict is obviously minimally truth-apt.  In fact, the very observation of 
persistent second-order conflict tells against the prospect for enunciating norms of 
assertibility that are sufficient to ensure the degree of agreement in judgment (and thus, 
the degree of discipline) necessary for a discourse about second-order judgments (and the 
principle2-judgments that appeal to them) to qualify as minimally truth-apt.  When we 
argue about second-order reasons, there are no accepted standards for labeling one set of 
reasons ‘true’ and the other ‘false’, except from the perspective of particular second-order 
judgments themselves.  Regardless of how syntactically structured is the surface grammar 
of second-order conflict, if there is not enough agreement on standards of warrant to 
confer discipline, then second-order discourse is not minimally truth-apt.   
To summarize and expand upon the previous paragraph: if discourse about 
second-order conflict is not truth-apt owing to lack of agreement on how to define the 
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terms of discussion—what is ‘morally good’, what is ‘morally wrong’—then principle2-
judgments, each of which is based upon second-order reasons, can be true only relative to 
the second-order theories or outlooks to which they correspond.  And if this is so, then we 
are forced to an irrealist, relativist metaethical position for moral claims that appeal to or 
presuppose particular moral standards.  The only context in which a principle2-judgment 
is sufficiently disciplined to count as ‘true’ is one in which that judgment refers to the 
second-order standards that entail it or to which it appeals.  This result (trivially) satisfies 
the first of Wright’s goals: (1) to honor the irrealist intuition.  It fails, however, to satisfy 
the second: (2) to honor the integrity of moral discourse.  To any principle2-proposition, 
“P is true,” must be appended the clause, “relative to theory X.”  And this relative truth is 
not at all the sort of truth Wright is aiming to secure, as evidenced by his emphasis that it 
is a necessary condition for any proposition to count as ‘true’ that it satisfy the platitude, 
“Truth is absolute, timeless, and stable.”54  
Ordinary moral language, Wright himself argues, traffics in imperatives and 
absolutes: if a speaker says “P is morally good,” she does not mean “P is morally good 
according to my endorsement of theory X but false or of indeterminate value according to 
other theories.”  She means, “P is morally good, period.”  The acknowledgment of 
relativism undermines the categorical use of moral language.55  Whereas many first-order 
conflicts may be plausibly explained by appeals to the vagueness of certain moral 
predicates, in Wright’s scheme second-order conflicts and the principle2-conflicts that 
correspond to them are better explained by reference to ‘intransigent disputes of 
inclination’.  Second-order predications of ‘morally good’ simply do not admit of 
                                                 
54 Wright (2003), “On Being in a Quandary,” p. 454 
55 Wright himself makes this point in criticizing the moral relativism of Gilbert Harman.  Wright (2003), 
“On Being in a Quandary,” p. 451. 
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borderline cases in the way first-order predications of ‘courageous’ do, for what is called 
‘morally good’ changes markedly from theory to theory.56
 
VI. Problems and Potential Solutions 
It appears, however, that accepting this conclusion leaves us with an unusual 
hybrid view, in which those ostensibly first-order judgments that tacitly appeal to 
particular second-order standards (principle2-judgments) are not truth-apt, while those 
first-order judgments that do not appeal to particular second-order standards (act-, 
description, and principle1-judgments) are truth-apt.  I noted above that first-order 
judgments of the latter kind are made either under the auspices of a sort of value 
pluralism or are made with an inchoate understanding of the reasons granting authority to 
the principles one accepts.  Both act- and description-conflict, however, are apt, though 
not required, to be construed in a relativistic framework as sketched above, because they 
may occur within a particular second-order standard just as easily as they occur for the 
pluralist or commonsense moralist.   
Act-conflict concerns which act best satisfies a given principle in some 
circumstance, and that principle may be what I’ve termed a principle2, judgments about 
which, I have argued above, must be construed relativistically on Wright’s framework.  
Likewise, description-conflict can occur within any particular second-order standard, as 
                                                 
56 There may be a further problem with identifying second-order conflicts with intransigent disputes of 
inclination.  If ‘inclinations’ guide a subject’s choice of second-order moral judgments and these 
inclinations have their source in various facts about a subject—one’s upbringing, education, gender, life 
experiences and the like—moral assertibility may be relativized, not only to a particular theory, but also 
perhaps to a particular person.  This is a more radical, indexical relativist conclusion, however, and my 
objection is more likely to stand with the less controversial conclusion: identifying second-order conflicts 
with intransigent disputes of inclination—and thereby denying the discipline necessary for both second-
order conflict truth-aptness and principle2-judgment truth-aptness—effectively sacrifices the integrity of 
moral discourse, and so fails to satisfy the project of internal accommodation.   
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two Kantians can disagree over whether Jane is courageous just as easily as can two 
pluralists or two commonsense moralists.  Principle1-conflict, on the other hand, is more 
resistant to a relativistic reading, as it is defined in such a way as to preclude its 
disputant(s) from appealing to a specific second-order standard.  But there are problems 
with leaving the issue at that.                 
Consider a more detailed version of the medical beneficence versus autonomy 
case.  One agent, A, who is a proponent of consequentialism, makes the principle2-
judgment that states, “It is morally preferable to perform the beneficial procedure.”  
Another agent, B, who somewhat unreflectively accepts commonsense morality, makes 
the principle1-judgment with the same content—“It is morally preferable to perform the 
beneficial procedure”—but does so simply because the outcome with the highest utility 
seems better (for a reason that B cannot successfully articulate) in this case than does the 
outcome in which the patient’s autonomy is respected.  One might quickly reply that A’s 
judgment should be reformulated in a way that includes A’s commitment to 
consequentialism, so that it reads, “It is morally preferable to perform the beneficial 
procedure because doing so will result in the greatest utility of the available options.”  
But reformulating the proposition does not change what seems strange about the 
example’s implication—namely, it would be odd to say that B’s judgment is truth-apt just 
because it does not appeal to a particular second-order standard, while A’s judgment is 
not truth-apt because it does tacitly appeal to such a standard.   
We might want to address this problem by arguing that the value pluralist and the 
commonsense moralist actually are appealing to second-order standards in this case, 
though those standards do not neatly fit into the “⁪∀x (Mx↔Dx)” schema introduced 
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above.  We might say that the pluralist (perhaps tacitly) accepts a second-order standard 
such as  
p is morally forbidden ↔ the wrongness of p outweighs the wrongness of q and 
the wrongness of r, where p, q and r pick out the morally relevant and mutually 
incompatible options. 
  
This formulation differs from the earlier schema, of course, in that both constituents of 
the biconditional contain moral content.  One problem with this sort of formulation is that 
it does nothing to ensure that two pluralists will agree on the content of judgments in a 
sufficient number of cases to confer discipline upon a pluralistic ethical discourse.  There 
is nothing in the ostensibly second-order standard that precludes two pluralists from 
wholeheartedly affirming the standard and yet, at the same time, coming to incompatible 
conclusions as to whether, for instance, p or q is the morally forbidden option, and for 
doing so in all like cases.  The same problem would plague a similar formulation 
intended to capture the supposed second-order standard affirmed by the common sense 
moralist: 
p is morally forbidden ↔ the rules of thumb constituting commonsense morality 
say that p is morally forbidden. 
 
Not only do both of these formulations threaten circularity, but also, because there is no 
purely descriptive formula in the second constituent of the biconditional, there is no 
pressure exerted by the standard for two proponents of that view to agree on particular 
first-order judgments that conform to it. 
 This is an unhappy result, for there seems to be a genuine sense in which some 
first-order discourse is truth-apt, even if the disputed judgments involved in a first-order 
conflict do not appeal to the same second-order standard.  Consider the sorts of moral 
disagreements we may think of as reasonable, where two equally well-situated disputants 
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can come down on incompatible sides of an issue, yet neither disputant can be charged 
with a cognitive shortcoming.  Disagreements over the permissibility of abortion, 
euthanasia, the unavoidable killing of non-combatants in war, the killing of animals for 
food and the death penalty all come to mind as possible instances of this general kind.  In 
all of these debates, it seems that the considerations in favor of each mutually 
incompatible position (concerning permissibility) are so closely matched as to 
underdetermine which is correct, so that, in the right circumstances, either may faultlessly 
be held.  Put another way, each question provides fertile ground for a quandary.  But if it 
is not a particular second-order standard that ensures such an agreement over the relevant 
considerations, what is it? 
 The most promising answer is, I think, that the preponderance of agents accepts 
certain judgments or commitments as paradigmatic instances of moral relevance, in spite 
of the diversity of the second-order standards to which they appeal.  All of the debates I 
listed in the preceding paragraph, for instance, concern the permissibility of killing in 
general, and the permissibility of murder in particular.  Nearly every moral view includes 
central norms against the taking of life in various circumstances, so we have from the 
outset a force for a significant degree of convergence in judgments.  In all of these 
debates, the question is not whether killing is, ceteris paribus, morally wrong; nearly 
everyone will agree to that.  The questions are rather (a) whether in the cases under 
discussion the killing amounts to murder, and (b) whether, even if it does, certain other 
considerations outweigh the badness of the killing/murder.  It is in addressing questions 
like (a) and (b) that intractable disagreements may arise.  But if those disagreements are 
structured and constrained by central moral commitments that nearly everyone accepts 
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and which therefore ensure a large overlap of judgments in easier cases (e.g. “It is wrong 
to kill people for mere entertainment”), then discourse constituted by first-order 
judgments concerning those central commitments is likely disciplined enough to be truth-
apt.  This would constitute a far smaller range of truth-apt moral discourses than Wright 
intends, but it would not be an insignificant range.  I will return to this issue of whether 
shared inter-standard moral judgments can avoid relativism in Chapter Three below.  
Unfortunately for Wright’s theory, I will present arguments that suggest that these shared, 
central commitments do not provide as stable a foundation as is necessary to preclude 
relativism.          
Even if the arguments I will present in Chapter Three do not prove decisive, the 
relativism to which I have already shown Wright’s view is committed is sufficient to 
guarantee that his view does not honor the integrity of moral discourse, and so fails to 
satisfy the project of internal accommodation.  I have argued that principle2-judgments 
can be true only relativistically.  Principle2-judgments determine the content of first-order 
judgments based upon an agent’s endorsement of second-order standards.  In this way, 
principle2-judgments reflect our ability to give reasons for the first-order views we hold.  
This activity of reason-giving is integral to moral discourse, and part of the internal 
accommodation project requires showing that making moral claims and deliberating 
about moral issues is, to a large extent, a rational enterprise.  But if those reasons are true 
or warranted or appropriate only within the particular moral discourses from which they 
originate, then disputants in principle2-conflict cannot offer reasons to one another.      
One possible way for Wright to resist these damaging relativist conclusions is to 
revise the notion of discipline so that it does not rely on the agreement of actual 
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judgments.  At one point, he proposes that for some irrealist discourses, “the consensus 
about which conditions warrant…assertion” ought to focus on the permissibility of 
assertibility, rather than on the obligation of assertibility.57  If several mutually 
incompatible judgments are each permissible in a particular situation, then, of course, 
their incompatibility need not necessitate the attribution of error.   
Wright takes comic discourse to be of this type, and maintains that it is 
“disciplined by the objective of irreproachability in the light of a community of comic 
sensibility.  And warrant for comic claims is warrant to think that they can meet that 
objective.”58  It is immediately apparent, however, that in the “community of moral 
sensibility,” the categorical nature of moral language will ensure that members who 
endorse particular second-order judgments will concomitantly find the judgments that are 
incompatible with their own reproachable, or, at least, morally misguided.  Hence, 
according to this revised notion of discipline, contentious second-order judgments lack 
warrant, since there is no reason to think that they can meet the objective of 
irreproachability.  This revision of ‘discipline’, then, clearly does not save Wright from 
the problems associated with second-order moral conflict.  
Alternatively, Wright might accept the claim that there are many moral discourses 
and yet respond that second-order discourse is nevertheless truth-apt in the following 
way.  If we move to a higher level of generality, we see that every predication of ‘wrong’ 
means something like “that which is forbidden by universal requirements,” or more 
simply, “that which ought not be done.”  This observation is certainly true, and it is not as 
though a Kantian and a consequentialist are unable to understand the other’s purpose in 
                                                 
57 Wright (1992), p. 95. 
58 Ibid., p. 106. 
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making moral assertions.  Both are engaged in the same moralizing activities—approving 
and disapproving, lauding and criticizing—and so the function of second-order judgments 
and principle2-judgments appears to be the same in both theories, regardless of the 
reasons behind their deployment.   
Even if we grant this response, however, the problem remains: when we attempt 
to determine who is correct and who is incorrect in a second-order moral disagreement, 
the lack of agreement on the criteria for correctness robs second-order discourse of 
discipline, and thus, of truth-aptitude.  Furthermore, focus on the generalities of moral 
language can lead us to forget that second-order and principle2-judgments not only 
display a formal structure, but also entail substantive content regarding why and on what 
basis a moral property is predicated of an act, principle, or character.  T.M. Scanlon 
makes a similar point: 
There are many different ideas about the source of overriding objective 
requirements on action: God’s law, the human telos, pure practical reason, and the 
value of justifiability to others or “unity with our fellow creatures.”  It seems clear 
that people can, without misusing the English language, use the terms ‘moral’, 
‘immoral’ and ‘morally wrong’ with the sincere intention of invoking standards 
based on any one of these sources.59
 
If the standards of assertibility for second-order judgments are as diverse as the above 
paragraphs suggest, when those judgments come into conflict, as they are bound to do, 
Wright’s account allows us to speak of truth only within a moral outlook, not among 
moral outlooks.  In this way, Wright’s framework falls short of vindicating the integrity 
of moral discourse, and so fails on its own terms.  
 
 
                                                 
59 T.M. Scanlon, “Moral Theory: Understanding and Disagreement.”  Philosophy and Phenomenological 








In developing his irrealist metaethical view, Mark Timmons shares both the 
methodological and the substantive philosophical commitments that motivate Wright’s 
account.60  I will discuss Timmons’ theory in this chapter for three primary reasons.  
First, whereas the metaethical theory offered by Wright is part of a larger framework for 
situating debates regarding realism and irrealism across many domains of discourse, 
Timmons restricts his discussion solely to ethics.  While this fact does not, in and of 
itself, guarantee a more plausible treatment of the issues, it does guarantee a more 
thorough treatment, which might help resolve the relativist problems that plague Wright’s 
account.  Second, despite all that the theories of Wright and Timmons share in common, 
Timmons goes about defending his view in a distinctive way.  Thus, even if we cannot 
salvage Wright’s theory, if Timmons’ theory satisfies both internal and external 
accommodation projects, we will have evidence that the notion of minimal truth can be 
successfully applied in metaethics.   
The conclusions of my arguments, however, will not be so sanguine about 
minimalism’s metaethical prospects.  In fact, I will argue that Timmons’ metaethical 
theory also entails relativism, though my argumentative approach will be different (and 
simpler) than the one I employed in objecting to Wright’s theory.  This point relates to 
my third reason for discussing Timmons’ theory: because he argues for a conclusion 
similar to Wright’s but in a distinctive way, the problem of relativism arises for Timmons 
                                                 
60 Cf. Mark Timmons, Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
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in a different light, and examining relativism in this light will add another dimension to 
our understanding of the threat that relativism may pose for the possibility of satisfying 
the project of internal accommodation.   
While I addressed the problem of relativism for Wright by discussing the 
necessary and sufficient conditions under which discourses regarding second-order and 
principle2-judgments could be minimally truth-apt, the problem I raise for Timmons’ 
theory is largely one of moral psychology.  This problem lies in determining whether, 
once we come to terms with the theoretical truth of relativism—that, metaphysically 
speaking, there are no objective moral truths, and hence, there is no principled way to 
favor one second-order standard over all others—we can then nevertheless act, from a 
practical point of view, as though relativism were not true.  Timmons argues that we can; 
I will argue that the distinction Timmons draws between the theoretical and practical 
perspectives (or, as he calls them, the ‘detached’ and ‘engaged’ perspectives) is 
implausible, leaving him open to the threat of relativism, which he, like Wright, regards 
as a mark of metaethical failure.   
In §II below, I will introduce Timmons’ view, which he terms ‘Assertoric Non-
descriptivism’.  In §III, I will describe how his view is vulnerable to a distinct variant of 
the relativist objection faced by Wright.  I will consider, in §IV, a possible line of defense 
Timmons might take against this relativist objection.  I will conclude that this line of 
defense fails, and that Timmons’ metaethical theory, like Wright’s before it, accordingly 




II. Assertoric Non-descriptivism & Contextual Moral Semantics 
Timmons begins constructing his brand of irrealism by affirming the thesis of 
semantic contextualism, which he formulates in the following way: 
CT   The truth value of (some, most, all) sentences that constitute some discourse 
D can vary from one context to another, owing to the semantic norms governing 
those sentences.61
 
The guiding idea is that the semantic norms are contextually sensitive, so that a sentence 
can count as true in one context but false (or just unacceptable) in another context, 
depending on the parameters of the conversation.  Conversational parameters are dictated 
by features such as the purposes and presuppositions speakers bring to a conversation.  
Timmons approvingly relates an example given by David Lewis:   
If you say ‘Italy is boot-shaped’ and get away with it, low standards are required 
and the standards fall if need be; thereafter ‘France is hexagonal’ is true enough.  
But if you deny that Italy is boot-shaped, pointing out the differences, what you 
have said requires high standards under which ‘France is hexagonal’ is far from 
true enough.62   
 
Across contexts, however, the concept of truth is constant: truth is a matter of correct 
assertibility.  It is what constitutes correct assertibility that varies according to context, 
and it changes in response to the interaction of two factors: (a) the norms governing a 
particular discourse and (b) the (discourse-independent) world.  Reminiscent of Wright’s 
formulation of truth-aptness, (a) includes both syntactic and semantic norms, with the 
former involving the grammatical and logical rules that govern the formation of 
sentences, and the latter, discipline-like norm governing the correct usage of the terms in 
a given domain of discourse.  While correct assertibility in certain realist discourses 
                                                 
61 Ibid., p. 111. 
62 David Lewis, “Scorekeeping in a Language Game.”  Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers.  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 245.  Originally published in Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979): 
339-59.  Quoted in Timmons (1999), p. 112. 
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depends on a rather direct interaction between (a) and (b), in other domains a statement 
may be true simply by virtue of the norms in (a) themselves.  Timmons identifies 
discourses involving analytic statements or statements in pure mathematics as potential 
instances of the latter sort, with moral discourse a close relative of these two.  
 Timmons next sets out to argue that moral sentences are genuine assertions, citing 
as evidence that fact that they are governed by the same syntactic and logical constraints 
as are descriptive sentences.  There is a real distinction to be had here, however, and that 
is between an assertion’s being descriptive and its being evaluative, with neither category 
being reducible to the other.  Timmons claims that evaluative assertions, of which moral 
assertions are the paradigm, do not seek to describe the world, but rather seek to guide 
action.  Emphasizing this difference, he writes, “Descriptive beliefs are maps by which 
we steer; evaluative beliefs do not map the world, but instead typically serve to regulate 
our choice of routes.”63
 Timmons now has the tools to sketch a minimalism about moral truth: since moral 
sentences are evaluative assertions, they need not correspond directly to any features or 
properties of the (discourse-independent) world, and so can be true solely by virtue of the 
semantic norms governing the discourse of which they are a part.  Furthermore, since 
evaluative assertions are not reducible to descriptive assertions, there can be no insightful 
translation of a moral sentence.  Accordingly, like Wright, Timmons accepts Tarski’s T-
schema, so that if asked “What is the content of P?” where ‘P’ is a moral proposition, the 
appropriate answer to give is simply: P.  
 We may rightly wonder, since Timmons’ theory is so similar to Wright’s, whether 
it entails the same sort of relativism.  Timmons is adamant that it should not entail 
                                                 
63 Timmons (1999), p. 143. 
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relativism, for he acknowledges that a relativist metaethical position does not satisfy the 
project of internal accommodation.  He writes,  
An insuperable problem for any version of relativism is that it simply does 
violence to a deeply embedded feature of ordinary moral discourse, namely, the 
fact that from an engaged moral stance, we assert moral statements and make 
truth ascriptions to moral statements categorically […]  If we ascend to the 
metalinguistic level and say that the statement ‘apartheid is morally wrong’ is 
true, we do not mean that it is true relative to some moral stance—we mean that 
that the statement is simply true.64
 
But Timmons explains the process of forming a moral judgment as bringing one’s moral 
outlook to bear on a question, so that it is ‘semantically appropriate’ to judge in 
accordance with that outlook.  Thus, it seems, a moral judgment is true relative to the 
outlook one is employing just in case the judgment is entailed by or is compatible with 
that outlook.  Timmons draws a distinction, however, between an assertion being 
semantically appropriate and it being correctly assertible, where only the latter concept is 
equivalent to truth.  It is only the conflation of these two notions, he claims, that leads an 
objector to charge him with relativism. 
 This distinction is tied to the fact that, as Timmons puts it,  
Just as first-order moral statements make moral-evaluative assertions, the 
corresponding truth ascriptions make them, too. […]  Semantic and moral 
assessment become fused when one attributes truth to moral statements: one’s 
semantic evaluations are made from within one’s moral outlook and thus express 
metalinguistically the specific moral stances that accompany the outlook.65  
  
So, the difference between semantic appropriateness and correct assertibility lies in the 
fact that, in ascribing the second notion to an assertion, the agent is a proponent of the 
moral outlook to which that assertion appeals.  We see here a major difference between 
Timmons’ and Wright’s account.  While Wright identified truth-aptness with syntactic 
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and disciplinary (semantic) constraints, Timmons includes an additional semantic 
constraint, which holds that, with regard to moral assertions, truth ascriptions are made 
only in a morally-committed way.  Timmons calls the failure to see this distinction the 
‘relativist’s fallacy’, and warns that “from the fact that people can and do judge that 
opposing moral statements can be semantically appropriate relative to different moral 
outlooks, one should not infer that truth as predicated of moral statements is relative.”66   
 Finally, returning to the issue of contextually variable parameters governing truth-
ascriptions in moral discourse, Timmons identifies two main, truth-relevant perspectives 
one may take towards moral assertions: the detached perspective and the engaged 
perspective.  From the detached perspective, one asks whether (a) and (b) (i.e. semantic 
norms of the discourse and the discourse-independent world) conspire to make any moral 
statement correctly assertible.  Since one is here appealing to features of the world not 
addressed by evaluative assertions (which, remember, are not in the business of 
describing the world), she must say that moral statements are neither correctly nor 
incorrectly assertible, neither true nor false.  This is the irrealist’s theoretical perspective, 
from which she judges that there are no moral facts or moral properties “out there” in the 
world.  In the morally engaged perspective, by contrast, one only appeals to (a).  It is 
from the morally engaged perspective, then, that one may ascribe truth to moral sentences 
by way of fusing semantic and moral evaluation, as discussed above. 
So, the same sentence uttered in different contexts may be granted different 
degrees of ‘semantic slack’.  For example, the sentence “The movie, ‘Lost in 
Translation,’ stars Bill Murray” may be correctly assertible in an everyday, non-
philosophical context, but the same sentence may not be correctly assertible when uttered 
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in a context that assumes a naturalistic philosophical perspective that denies the existence 
of the ontological category, ‘movie’.  Likewise, a moral sentence such as “It is wrong to 
cheat on one’s taxes” may be correctly assertible from a morally engaged perspective, but 
not correctly assertible from the detached perspective, which denies that the property 
‘wrongness’ exists in a naturalistic ontology.  In this way, Timmons hopes to secure the 
best of both worlds by employing the perspectival distinction to satisfy both internal and 
external accommodation projects.  
 
III. The Spectre of Relativism 
As the passages I quote above demonstrate, Timmons takes pains to argue that the 
application of contextual semantics to moral discourse does not entail a form of 
relativism.  I will argue throughout the rest of this chapter that we have reasons to find his 
defense against relativism implausible.  Timmons claims that a relativist interpretation of 
contextual moral semantics results in ‘relativized semantic tightness,’ whereby “the 
semantic norms governing moral discourse conspire with the world to yield outlook-
relative correct assertibility and correct deniability status (i.e., outlook-relative truth or 
falsity) for moral statements.”67  This feature of relativism, he says, does not comport 
with our experience of ordinary moral discourse and practice, in which we assert (and 
thereby ascribe truth to) moral statements categorically, because we are operating from 
within an engaged moral stance.  This description of moral discourse and practice seems, 
at first glance, to comport with the phenomenology of making first-order judgments.   
But what are we to make of a higher-order assessment from the detached 
perspective of one’s own acceptance of moral norms?  Say that one accepts Timmons’ 
                                                 
67 Ibid., p. 126. 
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account of moral discourse and realizes that moral truth can only be ascribed within an 
engaged perspective.  What justification would the person then have for holding any 
particular moral outlook?  As Russ Shafer-Landau notes,  
The absence of any moral facts outside particular outlooks makes it the case that 
judgments rendered within one outlook are no more justified or true than those of 
a competing outlook.  The views of each outlook are equally (un)justified, equally 
(un)true.  This is relativism.68   
 
While Timmons is focused on the way in which the use of moral language shapes the 
phenomenology of moral practice, the current worry is that the higher-order 
understanding (corresponding to the acceptance of Timmons’ theory) of what moral 
practice actually consists of may likewise have a dramatic, and perhaps countervailing, 
effect on moral phenomenology.  More specifically, while Timmons is focused on moral 
semantics, there remains a live question of moral epistemology, as whether one can 
legitimately consider herself justified in adopting a particular second-order standard will 
likely have as much effect on moral phenomenology as does one’s experiential 
understanding that moral language as categorical.  And in attempting to satisfy the project 
of internal accommodation, Timmons would agree, matters of moral phenomenology are 
central. 
What ought a reflective person’s attitude be toward her own second-order 
standard when presented with another standard that is equally coherent, yet leads to a 
different conclusion on some moral question?  Is one justified in holding steadfastly to 
one moral outlook just because she happens to have a particular moral sensibility and not 
another?  The concern is, roughly, that judgments issuing from one coherent moral 
outlook are no more justified than are incompatible judgments issuing from a different 
                                                 
68 Russ Shafer-Landau, “Review of Morality Without Foundations.”  Ethics 111, No. 4 (July 2001), pp. 
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coherent moral outlook, for semantic norms do not conspire with the world to make 
moral sentences semantically correct.  Thus, there seems to be no principled reason to 
ascribe truth to a particular moral outlook beyond the fact that one already views the 
terrain of plausible moral outlooks from a particular, already-engaged moral perspective.  
And it seems a stretch to call that a ‘principled’ reason.  Assessing the situation from a 
detached perspective, it seems that if one moral judgment is no more justified than an 
incompatible judgment, then one lacks justification for ascribing ‘truth’ to either one, 
even if it is constitutive of the phenomenology of engaged moral experience that we treat 
most of our own moral views categorically.  
Luckily for the objector, Timmons maintains an interest in moral epistemology, 
and his writing on the subject69 is a natural place to search for the potential answer to the 
problem.  Timmons’ theory of epistemological contextualism holds that doxastic 
justification involves conformity to a set of epistemic norms which are determined by 
describing an idealized, but realistic, epistemic agent.  The operative notion for this agent 
is “epistemic responsibility,” where the criteria for responsible epistemic agency involve 
reference to reasonable minimal thresholds with respect to memory and intelligence, as 
well as a social dimension that involves the canvassing of “obvious counterpossibilities,” 
the obviousness of which is determined by knowledge held as “common” by one’s 
community of interlocutors.  These epistemic norms are not algorithmic, however, as 
they must leave room for epistemic judgment as a second crucial aspect within the larger 
category of proper epistemic sensibility.      
Timmons claims that one can be epistemically responsible in holding some belief 
without also being epistemically justified in holding it.  Such contextually basic beliefs—
                                                 
69 Ch. 5: “Moral Justification in Context,” in Timmons (1999). 
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which constitute the core of an agent’s moral outlook—are acquired and endorsed 
responsibly if there are no obvious reasons to suppose that they are false.  Positive 
evidence for their truth is not necessary.70  Timmons adds a proviso which holds that, in 
addition to there being no obvious defeaters for a contextually basic belief, the agent 
must also have confidence in that belief’s being epistemically sound,71 though this 
confidence does not arise in response to the belief’s being self-evident.72  Contextually 
basic moral beliefs, for instance, must strike the agent as being both intuitively obvious 
and non-arbitrary.  This proviso exemplifies what Timmons calls “second-order 
conservatism,” where “one must at least be disposed to believe that one’s first-order 
beliefs are epistemically sound if those beliefs are to be responsibly held.”73  Again, this 
notion of a belief’s being “epistemically sound” seems to amount to a vague sense of 
confidence in that belief’s being true.   
Disappointingly, Timmons’ account of moral epistemology does not add any 
substantive features that would save his account from the potentially damaging relativist 
objection.  Moral knowledge, just like moral truth, is only ascribed from an engaged 
perspective and there are no objective criteria one must meet in coming to some moral 
belief or judgment.  Under a contextually-informed reliabilist account of moral 
knowledge, for instance, we assess an agent’s belief according to whether the agent 
displays a “moral sensibility that generates, as it were, a high proportion of true to false 
moral beliefs,”74 where, of course, what counts as true or false is judged from a particular 
                                                 
70 It seems possible that one could also be responsible, though not justified, in holding a non-basic belief, 
though Timmons does not address this issue. 
71 Cf. Timmons (1999)., p. 212. 
72 Cf. Ibid., p. 232. 
73 Ibid., p. 240. 
74 Ibid., p. 245. 
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moral stance.  Thus, the worry about the justification for holding a particular second-
order view remains unanswered. 
This is the kernel of my objection: The fact that there are two distinct 
perspectives—morally engaged and morally detached—from which one can 
appropriately speak of truth does not guarantee that the judgments one makes from one 
perspective will not affect the judgments in the other.  Irrealists have been able to 
embrace notions of minimalist truth via the Disquotational Scheme in order to legitimize 
the ordinary uses of moral language, so that they can make the same assertions as can 
moral realists.  Where ‘P’ is a moral proposition, irrealists can join realists in licensing 
expressions such as “It is true that P,” “P corresponds to the facts,” and so on.  But while 
the semantic differences between the two metaethical approaches have nearly collapsed, 
what remains are metaphysical, or more specifically, explanatory differences.  As James 
Dreier notes, “The divide between realism and irrealism, at least in metaethics, rests on 
the substance of questions about metaphysical explanation.”75   
Realists may then have more confidence in making their moral assertions because 
they explain truth by pointing to a certain relationship between an assertion and an 
objective state of affairs or sort of property.  Irrealists, on the other hand, realize by virtue 
of the detached perspective that there exist multiple equally consistent but incompatible 
moral outlooks or sets of principles, and that there is no “moral high ground”76 from 
which to choose between them.  When irrealists shift to the morally engaged perspective, 
it would be unrealistic to think that this realization is completely left behind.  To maintain 
                                                 
75 James Dreier, “Metaethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism.”  Philosophical Perspectives 18: 
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76 See Paul Bloomfield, “Is There a Moral High Ground?”  Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 4 
(Winter 2003), pp. 511-26. 
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such a position would be to posit tacitly a rather odd moral psychology in which there are 
strict, practically impenetrable boundaries between the various perspectives one may 
take.   
In trying to balance the understandings from each perspective, a serious tension 
emerges.  While judging from a morally engaged perspective, one must believe, either 
implicitly or explicitly, that their second-order reasons for endorsing particular first-order 
moral judgments are superior to alternative reasons for endorsing different, incompatible 
judgments.  Nevertheless, the irrealist must concurrently admit—if she is intellectually 
honest and sufficiently reflective—that there is no objective standard to which one may 
appeal to justify one’s choice of principles.  An irrealist understanding from the detached 
perspective has the potential to undermine, or at least weaken, one’s morally engaged 
confidence in the legitimacy of awarding special moral weight to a particular set of 
second-order reasons.  This threat exists because the two primary perspectives, and thus 
the content of the judgments made therein, are not wholly separable. 
 
IV. The Relevance of Moral Phenomenology 
One obvious way for Timmons to defend his account against the present objection 
would be to appeal to data from the study of moral phenomenology in order to offer 
evidence that the engaged and detached perspectives are wholly separable in practice.  If 
they are in fact as distinct as he assumes, then Timmons’ account may stand.  Though he 
does not appear to be aware of my type of objection, Timmons does explore issues of 
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moral phenomenology in a series of recent papers,77 so I will briefly address his 
discussion to see if it contains any material suitable for a defense.   
Timmons characterizes the phenomenology of occurrent belief as involving a 
psychological process in which one involuntarily “comes down on” some issue by 
classifying a particular token as falling under a specific type, where one takes oneself to 
have a rational basis for making this particular categorization and warrant or ability to 
express the categorization in the declarative mood.78  Thus, an agent will classify some 
action that presents itself as “to be done” as ‘good’, and will classify it as such 
involuntarily, in the sense that it seems to the agent that it is not a matter of her choosing 
to place the action in this category, but rather that there are reasons independent of her 
preferences that ground her doing so.  By linking the involuntariness of moral beliefs to 
the experience of such beliefs “as possessing a kind of rational authority,”79 Timmons 
draws an analogy to the way we form beliefs about nonmoral perceptual matters.  For 
instance, when I walk into a room and see a chair in the corner, it does not occur to me 
that I have a much of a choice in the matter of believing whether I see a chair in the 
corner—the belief is involuntary.  Another way of putting the point is that the 
normativity of moral beliefs seems to issue from one’s experiences or circumstances 
themselves.  What Timmons calls “direct ought-beliefs,” following Maurice 
Mandelbaum,80 are those experienced from a first-person perspective where one 
                                                 
77 Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, “Cognitivist Expressivism,” in Metaethics After Moore, ed. by 
Horgan and Timmons.  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 255-98; Horgan and Timmons, 
“Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory,” in Philosophical Issues, Vol. 15 (2005); Horgan and 
Timmons, “Moorean Moral Phenomenology,” forthcoming.  Horgan and Timmons make largely the same 
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authors simply as ‘Timmons’ rather than ‘Horgan and Timmons’, just for the sake of simplicity. 
78 Horgan and Timmons (2006), p. 263. 
79 Ibid., p. 264. 
80 Maurice Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience (Glenco, Ill: The Free Press, 1955). 
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experiences a ‘felt demand’ on her actions.81  Direct ought-beliefs play a “motivationally 
hot functional role,”82 which is simply to say that they are, ceteris paribus, accompanied 
by a motivational force that is aimed at action. 
Timmons’ discussion of moral phenomenology seems more or less on target, but 
is, for the purpose of mounting a defense, insufficient.  He never explicitly relates 
phenomenological concerns to the engaged/detached distinction, so I will now explore 
several considerations that may be relevant.  First, let me offer a crude distinction that 
may nevertheless add some needed subtlety to the discussion.  Call those people 
‘reflective’ moral agents who possess a disposition to think carefully and critically about 
their first-order judgments and the second-order reasons supporting them.  Call those 
people ‘unreflective’ moral agents who lack such a disposition.  There will, of course, be 
many people who fall along the spectrum between these two antipodes; let us assume for 
ease of discussion, though, that there are only these two groups.   
It is not clear whether Timmons’ discussion of phenomenological matters is 
meant to capture the moral experience of the reflective, the unreflective, or both, but we 
should perhaps assume it is ‘both’, since he does not see fit to make a distinction.  While 
it may be true that, in either case, moral beliefs are experienced as involuntary and 
dictated by justifying reasons originating outside oneself, there is still the matter of what 
one is to do with those beliefs as they occur (either spontaneously or after a period of 
reflection).  That is, it is nearly always an open possibility to submit one’s beliefs to 
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further scrutiny and reflection.83  Why shouldn’t nonmoral, metaethical considerations 
affect the character of one’s first-order deliberative processes?   
Timmons makes a similar point that unwittingly supports my contention, though 
he uses it in addressing the question of whether moral phenomenology includes some 
descriptive aspect.  He writes,  
Moral phenomenology may very well be susceptible to influence by higher-order 
beliefs about the nature of morality itself.  Certainly many people believe that 
there are objective moral facts—a belief that can easily be instilled, for instance, 
through the persistent intertwining of religious instruction with moral education.84   
 
Here, Timmons is admitting that metaethical beliefs can influence one’s experience of 
what she is doing in making first-order moral claims.  The upshot of this fact is that the 
moral irrealist may very well take herself, at least in some instances of moral 
deliberation, as arriving at a belief that is true relative to her lights, though her moral 
outlook is no more objectively warranted than are several other equally consistent 
outlooks.   
We might use an analogy with games to shed light on the ways in which the 
engaged and detached perspectives interact in different agents’ lives, noting especially 
the difference between the ‘reflective’ and the ‘unreflective’.  Take, for instance, a game 
like basketball.  Basketball is a normative activity, as the play is structured according to a 
set of rules that each player must follow.  But even during the game (say, between plays), 
most people can step back to a detached perspective and realize that it is just a game and 
that its rules could have been different than what they are, and these realizations may 
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84 Ibid., pp. 274-5. 
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affect how seriously they take the outcome.85  Let us assume this is analogous to what the 
reflective irrealist does in forming moral beliefs.  The unreflective or naïve player may 
not be cognizant of the fact, while playing, that basketball is just a game (say, because 
she is so engrossed in the playing of it), and she would therefore take every rule as 
absolute.  Timmons seems to assume that every agent is like the naïve player, so 
engrossed in the activity of forming moral beliefs and so attached to their own outlook 
that they cannot, while making those judgments, “look up” from the process to consider 
the activity in which they are engaged.  Surely, this is a caricature, at least of the 
experience of the reflective agent.   
If, as I have been arguing in this chapter, the sharp distinction between the 
engaged and detached perspectives is unstable, then one who accepts Timmons’ irrealist 
metaethical view faces a serious tension.  She accepts the judgment that, from a detached 
perspective, there are no objective moral truths, and thus no objective reasons to guide 
the choice between one of several internally consistent but mutually incompatible 
second-order standards.  On the other hand, if she also wants to remain wholeheartedly 
committed to a particular second-order standard, she must act as though she does have 
reason to prefer it over the alternatives.  The agent faces the problem of justifying her 
acceptance of a particular standard when she realizes that each standard is equally 
(un)justified.  If the agent is ambivalent about whether the moral standard she accepts 
legitimately deserves the conferral of overriding importance her endorsement of it 
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requires, then she is unlikely to assert categorically many of the claims entailed by that 
standard.  And if, as a result of accepting a metaethical view, agents are no longer willing 
to assert the majority of their moral claims categorically, then that metaethical view fails 





















Chapter Three  
Accommodating Relativism: Prospects and Limitations 
I. Introduction 
If my arguments above are successful in demonstrating that both Wright’s and 
Timmons’ application of a minimal conception of truth to an irrealist metaethical 
framework leads to relativism, then their accounts fail on their own terms; both authors 
claim that if a metaethical account entails relativism, then it fails to satisfy the internal 
accommodation project of doing justice to the integrity of moral discourse, because a 
relativistic analysis fails comport with commonsense understandings of moral practice.  
We ought not accept Wright’s and Timmons’ claim, however, without briefly examining 
whether the sort of relativism to which their accounts lead is necessarily a harmful one.  
That examination is the purpose of the present chapter.     
The sort of moral relativism in which I am interested in this paper is often called 
metaethical relativism.  This view holds, roughly, that there is no universally true 
standard or set of criteria guiding moral assessment.  Rather, there are many such 
standards and sets of criteria.  Scanlon writes,  
[It is] a “necessary condition for an account of judgments of a certain kind to be 
relativistic that the cardinal virtue for judgments of that kind…cannot be assigned 
absolutely, but only relative to certain conditions or parameters.”86   
 
The cardinal virtue we have been considering is that of being true, and so we should 
interpret metaethical relativism as holding that a moral judgment may only be spoken of 
as true for a particular agent or true within a particular community of agents, so that 
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moral truth does not aspire to an objective status that would make a moral judgment true 
for all agents across all communities.  This position revises, and perhaps undermines, the 
common conception of truth, which holds that if a proposition is true, it is true for 
everyone.87     
Metaethical relativism should be distinguished from two other types of relativism: 
descriptive relativism and normative relativism.88  Descriptive relativism simply 
explicates the common sociological observation that different moral standards are 
accepted by different individuals and/or by different communities.  The central claim of 
descriptive relativism—that moral beliefs vary in relation to different persons or 
societies—can be made with reference to just first-order moral judgments or to both first- 
and second-order moral judgments.  It is uncontroversial that descriptive relativism is 
true of first-order moral judgments, as conflict regarding those judgments is a seemingly 
constant feature of moral discourse and practice.  Some argue, however, that first-order 
moral conflict can be attributed solely to disagreement (and thus, on this view, error) with 
regard to the factual features involved in a given case, so that there would be no second-
order disagreement if all the facts were known by both disputants.89  Both the position I 
have been sketching—that second-order conflict is a genuine occurrence—and the 
positions defended by Wright and Timmons, deny this claim.  Our positions maintain that 
                                                 
87 Cf. Richard Brandt, “Ethical Relativism” in Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 3 
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epistemic peers can hold incompatible second-order judgments.  The truth of second-
order descriptive relativism provides a prima facie reason for considering metaethical 
relativism, though it does not entail it.  One could accept the former view and still claim 
that there is always a single correct moral judgment in a particular circumstance.  
Obviously, metaethical relativism denies this claim. 
Metaethical relativism is also conceptually independent from normative 
relativism, which holds that “the moral requirements binding on a person depend on…her 
intentions, desires or beliefs (or the intentions, desires, or beliefs of people in her 
society).”90  Normative relativism is an unattractive metaethical view because it holds 
that, as they say, “anything goes.”  For instance, forms of normative relativism with 
varying scopes will approve of the propositions, “If I believe that p is good for me, then p 
is good for me,” or “If society S says that q is forbidden for every agent A, then q is 
forbidden for every A in S.”  Metaethical relativists need not commit themselves to the 
normative relativist claim that the dispositions a person actually has (or those that are 
actually dominant in a person’s community) determine what counts as morally right for 
that person.   
Rather, metaethical relativism has the flexibility to provide a more attractive 
view.  For instance, Richard Brandt develops an ‘ideal self’ view, according to which an 
action “A would be prohibited by that moral code which I, if I were fully rational, would 
support for the society of the agent of A, if I expected to live there.”91  This sort of view 
is still genuinely relativist because it depends on facts about the speaker under ideal 
conditions and, by making the idealizing clause indexical, it leaves room for the 
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possibility that even under those conditions a second-order judgment endorsed by one 
speaker will not necessarily be compatible with a one endorsed by another.   
Brandt’s appeal to our ideally rational selves is motivated by the assumption that 
the employment of such a heuristic device is likely to result in the selection of second-
order judgments that are most in concert with one’s moral sensibilities, which may, in 
actual circumstances, be skewed due to lack of information or reflection or a fault in 
reasoning.  The best way to determine “whether relativism about moral principles at the 
philosophical level is a correct theory”92 is to abstract away such potential faults in order 
to discover the extent to which our second-order judgments are actually (in)compatible.  
Brandt contends that, once doing so, we will find a significant degree of compatibility 
among the features that all ideally rational agents would prefer be included in the moral 
code governing the society in which they live.  For instance, all rational persons would 
want “a system fostering self-restraints, mutual trust, openness, the absence of need to be 
on one’s guard against malicious attacks.”93  The articulation of this sort of view marks 
an attempt to distinguish a plausible, moderate form of metaethical relativism both from 
the unattractive normative relativist position and from the extreme form of metaethical 
relativism that often serves as the object of attacks by relativism’s opponents.  I will 
consider other attempts to articulate a moderate form of metaethical relativism in §III 
below.   
Extreme metaethical relativism holds that no moral judgments or standards are 
objectively true or false, while the aforementioned moderate metaethical relativism holds 
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that some, though not all, moral judgments are objectively true or false.94  If extreme 
metaethical relativism is considered malignant because of its negative implications for 
the project of internal accommodation, we may consider the work of Brandt and several 
other like-minded philosophers as attempts to develop a moderate, potentially benign 
form of metaethical relativism.  Before turning to these accounts, however, I will first, in 
§II, take a closer look at why Wright and Timmons consider metaethical relativism such 
a threat.  After examining, in §III, the potential for formulating a benign metaethical 
relativism that comports with several central features of Wright’s and Timmons’ 
accounts, I will argue, in §IV, that the concept of benign relativism is itself unstable.  I 
will argue that moderate metaethical relativism collapses into extreme metaethical 
relativism, and so there is no genuinely ‘benign’ form of relativism with which to salvage 
the theories of Wright and Timmons. 
 
II. Revisiting Wright’s Worry  
 In trying to determine the best way to deal with moral conflict in minimally truth-
apt discourses like ethics, Wright considers and rejects indexical relativism, which is 
equivalent to the indexical version of normative relativism I introduced above.  This is 
the view that concepts such as ‘good’, ‘morally forbidden’, and ‘moral truth’ are 
relativized to an individual, and so would license a proposition such as “If I think P is 
true, then P is true for me.”  Wright complains that on this sort of view, “truth-conditional 
contents are indeed involved in ‘disputes’ of inclination, but actually there are no real 
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disputes involved,”95 since the relevant propositions make implicit appeals to different 
second-order standards.   
So, on the indexical normative relativist view, a disagreement over, for instance, 
whether it is morally permissible to eat meat will involve the claim by agent A, “Eating 
meat is morally permissible” to which is appended the clause, “for A.”  A will in turn 
interpret his disputant, B’s, claim as “Eating meat is morally forbidden for B.”  Wright 
objects that this way of interpreting disputes of inclination  
Seems destined to misrepresent the manner in which, at least ordinarily 
understood, the contents in question embed under operations like the conditional 
and negation.  If it were right, there would be an analogy between disputes of 
inclination and the “dispute” between one who says “I am tired” and her 
companion who replies, “Well, I am not”…It is not clear that we should expect 
that indexical relativism can save enough of the standard practice of discourses 
within which disputes of inclination may arise to avoid the charge that it has 
simply missed their subject matter.96
 
So, Wright’s worry here is that relativism robs moral discourse of the crucial role played 
by disagreement, since disputants are supposedly doomed to talk past rather than engage 
one another regarding the moral issue in question.   
Three points are salient here.  First, one should immediately notice that Wright 
has chosen the most extreme form of indexical normative relativism to voice his worry 
about metaethical relativism’s prospects for satisfying the project of internal 
accommodation.  As my brief introduction to Brandt’s view demonstrated, however, 
there are more charitable interpretations of metaethical relativism available.  For instance, 
the problem becomes much less serious if we interpret the two claims under discussion as 
a metaethical relativist would: “Eating meat is morally permissible according to standard 
X” and “Eating meat is morally forbidden according to standard Y.”   
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Second, and relatedly, when the claims are understood in this way, it is easy to 
locate a genuine dispute at the second-order level.  That is, the real dispute concerns, not 
simply the content of the first-order judgment regarding what is permissible or forbidden, 
but more deeply, which second-order standard of moral conduct we have most reason to 
accept as authoritative—X or Y.  This is principle2-conflict.  Furthermore, we can also 
locate a simple practical dispute over what to do.  Thus, even though they are appealing 
to distinct moral standards, the disputants are engaging each other on the practical subject 
of which actions one ought to perform and which attitudes one ought to foster.   
Third, despite Wright’s contention, the most pressing worry about normative 
relativism lies not simply in the problem of accounting for disputes of inclination in 
minimally truth-apt discourses.  Rather, what is most troublesome about indexical 
normative relativism is the fact that, as Scanlon notes, “certain moral judgments seem to 
us clearly true and important…[and] relativism is a threat in so far as it would force us to 
withdraw those judgments, or would undermine their claim to importance.”97  This worry 
is precisely the one to which my objection to Timmons’ view appealed—the lack of 
justification for selecting a particular second-order standard threatens to undermine the 
importance attributed to those standards in general.   
Furthermore, if we hold that an agent is only subject to the demands she thinks 
she is subject to, as indexical normative relativism would have it, then we may feel 
unjustified in making demands on her that she does not recognize.  But there are certain 
obvious demands that we think every plausible moral theory must include, such as those 
forbidding the torturing of children for fun.  In so far as indexical normative relativism 
would force us to keep mum with respect to those central and obvious moral 
                                                 
97 Scanlon (2001), p. 148. 
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requirements,98 it prevents the satisfaction of internal accommodation.  But it is the 
project of those advocating benign relativism—“relativism that can be accepted without 
undermining the judgments to which it applies”99—to demonstrate that there is indeed a 
successful alternative to indexical normative relativism.  
 
III. Benign Relativism100
 Philippa Foot defends a version of moderate metaethical relativism that she takes 
to be benign.  Foot begins by establishing an analogy between morality on the one hand, 
and judgments of beauty and other matters of taste on the other.  Key aesthetic concepts, 
she notes, work normally, i.e. attain a sort of objectivity and are truth-apt, only in a 
community “where there are shared reactions.”101  But when this shared foundation is left 
behind—say, in discussing matters of taste with one from another culture with different 
aesthetic sensibilities—employing terms like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’102 seems to make little 
sense.  Of course, one can still use these terms in ordinary discourse; but without the 
presupposition of some common standards, terms like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘true’ and 
‘false’, are not used substantially,103 since there is not enough agreement or, as Wright 
would have it, ‘discipline’, to make those terms sufficiently meaningful for discussing 
                                                 
98 We would keep mum because indexical normative relativism would say that those requirements are 
binding on us only because we think they are binding on us, and so those requirements are not binding on 
others if those others do not think they are binding on them.  We may protest, on the other hand, out of 
prudential concern for ourselves or our loved ones, by trying to persuade others to accept our moral 
outlook. 
99 Scanlon (2001), p. 150. 
100 My treatment of the issues in this section is influenced by Scanlon (2001) and Scanlon, What We Owe to 
Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), Chapter 8: Relativism.  
101 Philippa Foot, “Moral Relativism,” The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, 1978.  Reprinted in 
Carson and Moser (2001), p. 188. 
102 Perhaps this is more clearly stated by employing their aesthetic equivalents, such as ‘beautiful’ and 
‘ugly’. 
103 Cf. Bernard Williams, “The Truth in Relativism,” in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), pp. 132-43.  ‘Substantially’ is equivalent to ‘objectively’. 
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aesthetic matters in an intercultural context.  Local, i.e. relativized, truth is the only sort 
of truth available in these ‘undisciplined’ contexts.   
In extending the analogy to morality for the purpose of defending a moderate 
metaethical relativism, the task then becomes to discover some sort of minimal standard 
shared across a number of moral theories in order to demonstrate that there is some non-
local substantive truth—that is, to demonstrate that truth is not relativized only to 
particular second-order standards.  This task can be accomplished, Foot argues, by 
examining both the purpose of morality and the related issues of basic human needs that 
exist across cultures and times.  Foot writes,  
There is a great deal that all men have in common.  All need affection, the 
cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.  It isn’t true to 
suppose that human beings can flourish without these things—being isolated, 
despised or embattled, or without courage or hope.104   
 
Hence, it is not the case that just any set of consistent and action-guiding principles can 
properly be called a morality; the principles must meet this minimal standard of 
coordinating behavior in a way that promotes human flourishing.105  The sorts of 
considerations Foot lists above help constitute the “definitional criteria” that limit the 
content of anything that can properly be called a morality.  The notion of definitional 
criteria connects nicely to our earlier observation that some first-order judgments are 
truth-apt because a number of different second-order judgments will converge in agreeing 
on how to evaluate some act, character, or state of affairs. 
For example, a Kantian, a consequentialist, and a Buddhist will likely all agree 
that, ceteris paribus, murder is morally wrong.  Although their second-order explanations 
                                                 
104 Foot (2001), pp. 195-6. 
105 Martha Nussbaum defends a similar position in “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” in 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 242-69.  
Reprinted in Carson and Moser (2001), pp. 199-225. 
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for murder’s wrongness are incompatible, their first-order judgments that it is wrong 
share identical content.  If we can isolate several general considerations related to human 
well-being106 that make up these definitional starting points, then we will have the basis 
for articulating a core set of moral principles or commitments whose truth is non-local 
because it is asserted by all moralities.  And if we have a prima facie plausible case for 
benign relativism, then we can avoid the negative implications Wright fears from 
indexical normative relativism, which implies an “anything goes” understanding of 
morality.  Even if we can successfully articulate certain core moral commitments, 
however, we will still have a genuine form of relativism, since, as Scanlon notes, “These 
definitional starting-points may underdetermine the content of morality.  There may be 
‘contingent principles’ on which different sets of standards could differ while still being 
fully entitled to be called moral standards.”107  Hence, once we have determined that 
several particular standards are genuinely moral standards because they satisfy the 
definitional criteria, there will be no more we can say about one standard being true and 
another false. 
It is important to remind ourselves, however, that it is not only the entailment of 
different contingent principles that distinguishes different second-order judgments; it is 
also, and relatedly, the account each gives about what matters morally and why.  The 
content of the contingent principles will, in turn, depend on the structure of and reasons 
provided by the second-order account.  The contingent principles are clearly those that 
                                                 
106 Saying that definitional starting points are constituted by considerations “related to human well-being” 
should not be interpreted as meaning that every morality must have human well-being as its ultimate focus, 
for many religious moralities do not strictly share that aim.  Rather, it should be interpreted as a weaker, 
and somewhat vague, claim about how morality must recognize and give central (though not necessarily 
ultimate) weight to the satisfaction of various human needs.  Problems arise, we will see, because different 
moralities include different scopes of individuals as morally considerable.   
107 Scanlon (2001), p. 152. 
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are most likely to be the subject of conflict and—to link the present discussion explicitly 
to Wright’s account—we may think of them as most prone to vagueness and the 
experience of a quandary.  Contingent principles are likely ones that concern contentious 
issues such as abortion, euthanasia, the moral status of non-human animals and of 
spatially and temporally distant humans, as well as certain perfectionist ideals.  There is 
no wide agreement as to the permissibility of actions involved in these debates.  While 
discussion of these difficult issues is sure to arouse passions in some whose second-order 
judgments lead them to view certain contingent principles as obvious because they follow 
directly from them,108 it is just as likely to be met with ambivalence or cautious, limited 
endorsement by reflective agents whose second-order judgments do not lead to one 
determinate conclusion with respect to the issue in question.  We may think those in the 
latter group are apt for experiencing quandaries.109   
 
IV. Prospects for Accommodation 
The benign relativist view has interesting parallels with Wright’s view, though it 
also differs in several ways.  Benign relativism would maintain that many first-order 
judgments are truth-apt because they meet the relevant syntactical and disciplinary 
constraints, where the discipline is provided by the agreement guaranteed by definitional 
criteria.  Furthermore, benign relativism maintains that there is a large range of 
judgments—namely, those regarding contingent principles—with respect to which 
                                                 
108 Some will perhaps have such a strong commitment to a contingent principle that they will not view it as 
contingent, despite the degree of disagreement surrounding it, and will instead lobby for its inclusion as a 
core principle.  These people would view their disputants as exhibiting a sort of moral blindness for failing 
to endorse a moral proposition that seems, to them, obviously central.   
109 Quandaries, remember, are relativized to individual thinkers, so what may cause a quandary for one 
thinker need not cause a quandary for another thinker whose second-order judgments entail a definite 
answer to the moral question in dispute. 
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disagreement can be blameless.  These two features would count in favor of Wright 
accepting the view.  If Wright and Timmons were to concede that their accounts lead to 
relativism and then agree to endorse a benign version of relativism, however, they would 
then have to admit that contingent principles are not truth-apt because they do not exhibit 
sufficient discipline.110  This admission would constitute a heavy blow for Timmons’ 
theory in particular, since his framework does not provide the tools for distinguishing 
between the truth and untruth (a category including both falsity and indeterminacy) of 
assertions made from the engaged perspective.   
The concession would also prevent Timmons’ theory from benefiting from 
accepting benign relativism in the following way.  Along the lines I pursued in Chapter 
Two, we must now consider whether benign relativism has the effect of undermining the 
importance one takes one’s moral commitments to have.  We have established that the 
definitional criteria that are the hallmark of benign relativism underdetermine an 
extensive part of the content of the various standards that qualify as ‘moral.’  Hence, both 
endorsing a particular second-order standard and accepting benign relativism “would 
require us to accept the idea that other, opposing judgments are equally correct and that 
there is no question of truth between our standards and the ones reflected in these 
judgments.”111   
While much of Wright’s and Timmons’ concerns revolve around how we 
understand the semantic import of moral discourse, the present point has more to do with 
the global threat relativism poses to how we understand the justification we have for 
embracing and attributing value to the standards we employ in coming to our moral 
                                                 
110 More specifically, contingent principles are not truth apt in a non-local, substantive way.  They are, of 
course, truth-apt relative to the moral standard to which they implicitly appeal. 
111 Scanlon (2001), p. 154. 
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judgments, when no set of standards can be shown to be objectively better than all others.  
These issues are separable conceptually but, as I have argued in Chapter Two with 
respect to Timmons’ theory, are not wholly divorced from one another practically; one’s 
understanding of whether relativism undermines the importance she can legitimately 
attach to her own standards will affect how she understands the meaning and weight of 
the moral claims she asserts.    
In making a second-order judgment, one is deciding what matters most morally 
and why, and hence is deciding which considerations to award the unique weight that 
marks moral authority.  But benign relativism concomitantly asks that one realize that the 
moral standard to which one awards this authority is not objectively privileged over other 
moral standards.  So, in a problem analogous to the one I sketched for Timmons in the 
previous chapter, the agent is again placed in a situation where she must take certain 
contingent moral principles (entailed by her standard) as overriding and at the same time 
admit that there is no objective reason to award special weight to these particular 
contingent principles.   
This worry may present itself either as a skepticism that those who make different 
second-order judgments could really have as good a reason for them as one does for her 
own second-order judgments (owing to one’s confidence that her own moral standard is 
most reasonable), or, as I have been characterizing it, as a skepticism about one’s own 
justification for taking her particular second-order judgments and the contingent 
principles they entail as overriding.  Scanlon suggests that the former type of skepticism 
can be avoided if, when faced with an interpersonal second-order conflict, “we accept the 
substantive evaluative judgment that both ways of life are worthy of respect and 
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adherence.”112  But this suggestion is apt to prove unconvincing in many cases, for there 
is nothing in the definitional criteria to guarantee this sort of tolerance towards other 
moral standards, and it seems especially unlikely if one is faced with a disputant whose 
standard entails a number of contingent principles that are incompatible with one’s own.  
Thus, accepting benign relativism does not substantially benefit Timmons’ theory, since 
it merely moves the problem of justifying one’s acceptance of a moral standard into a 
different conceptual framework, leaving the project of internal accommodation 
unsatisfied.   
What, then, are Wright’s prospects for success in accepting benign relativism?  
There are two main problems for Wright, the second of which may prove fatal to his 
prospects for salvaging his theory by incorporating benign relativism.  The first problem 
is this.  It is not entirely clear where the boundaries lie between core and contingent 
principles.  Put another way, it is not clear how inclusive are the definitional starting 
points.113  A purported benefit of employing definitional criteria is that one is not forced 
to accept the unattractive extreme metaethical relativist position, which would prevent 
one from saying that even those actions which seem most obviously wrong are truly 
morally wrong.  Definitional criteria limit what counts as a morality by granting non-
local, substantive truth to certain standards that give central weight to human flourishing 
and well-being. 
One of the difficulties with this concept is that there are a number of ways to 
understand “human flourishing” and to explain what sorts of actions, policies and 
attitudes support it, and all of these ways appear to be based upon arguments that already 
                                                 
112 Ibid., p. 160. 
113 Scanlon puts the point by noting that it is unclear “how much is determined by the criteria internal to the 
concept of morality, and how much room is left for relativism.”  Scanlon (2001), p. 153. 
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presuppose some substantive moral commitments.  One matter we must settle in order to 
determine what human flourishing consists in requires us to specify whether we ought to 
award the greatest weight to promoting the interests of humans (and perhaps other 
species) as individuals, as groups, or as a whole.  This question is a variant of the 
question whether morality ought to focus on the well-being of individuals, of particular 
communities, or of everyone considered impartially.   
Consider fundamentalist religious groups that suppress the freedoms of women.  
This practice is clearly antithetical to the flourishing of the women (both as individuals 
and as a group) in these communities, but it may nevertheless promote the preservation of 
that religious community as a whole.  Though most people in the West take it as 
fundamental that the locus of moral value is the individual, this assumption is not shared 
universally.  Even in the West, some communitarians think the preservation of their 
particular way of life trumps the interests of particular individuals in their 
communities.114   
So, should the freedom to choose how one lives and the community of which one 
is a member be considered a core moral principle?  Some people would accept this claim 
as true and others would either deny it outright or argue that it is a contingent matter.  
The proponent of benign relativism will have to do a good deal more work in either 
specifying the concept of flourishing or in explaining how we ought to deal with the 
ostensibly large degree of vagueness in determining which principles are constitutive of 
definitional criteria, and hence, which moral assumptions we can take as shared in order 
to posit certain moral claims as non-locally, substantially true.  Until this matter is dealt 
                                                 
114 Or perhaps, they think that the way of life is in the interests of every group member, though not every 
member recognizes it. 
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with successfully, benign relativism cannot be considered to have satisfied the project of 
internal accommodation, for it does not provide a useful framework unless one can 
determine which principles are core, and thus ‘true’, and which are just contingent. 
The second, likely fatal objection claims that benign relativism cannot deal with 
the first problem of further specifying the content of the definitional criteria.  Benign 
relativism cannot complete this task, this second objection runs, because there are no 
definitional criteria.  That is, there is no set of moral judgments or core moral truths upon 
which every system legitimately called a morality would agree.  Instead, morality must 
be understood minimalistically.  On this view, moralities are simply sets of practical 
principles intended to govern the actions and attitudes of people and the interactions 
between people.  This minimal definition of ‘morality’ provides no guarantee that any of 
the diverse types of normative injunctions that a morality might include—even if one 
grants that all moralities employ a variant of the concept, “flourishing”—will be 
compatible with those of all other moralities.   
Nietzschean morality, for instance, shows an eagerness to sacrifice countless 
“flies in the marketplace” to make possible the Übermensch, the realization of whom 
would justify any number of perceived “harms” or “injustices.”  Or, consider a morality 
in a feudal society, which could provide a sophisticated account of why peasants have no 
moral worth, so that a member of the ruling class could endorse the proposition, “It is 
permissible to kill people for mere entertainment,” a proposition which, at first glance, it 
seemed no morality could license.   
Objectors will be quick to argue that there must be a distinction between 
Nietzschean and feudal systems of practical principles on the one hand, and genuine 
 75
moralities on the other, because the former do not exhibit feature F, where F is a 
definitional criterion that appeals to the fundamental equality of people, or to the inherent 
wrongness of causing pain intentionally and needlessly, or to any other of a number of 
possibilities.  But we should be careful to examine the structure of this objector’s claim 
and to situate it in the preceding discussion.   
If first-order moral judgments concern the content of moral claims—which acts 
are right or wrong, obligatory or forbidden—and second-order judgments concern which 
moral standards we have most reason to endorse, then this objector is making a third-
order judgment about which sorts of commitments must be included in a set of practical 
principles in order for it to count as a morality.  The structure of a third-order judgment is 
something like the following: 
The set of practical principles, S, is a morality ↔ S contains a central 
commitment to feature F. 
 
But notice that there will be just as much potential for third-order conflict as there is for 
first- and second-order conflict.  There will be disagreements over what features are 
necessary for a morality, and those disagreements will stem from substantive 
disagreements about what features are most morally important.   
Thus, though it first appeared that moderate metaethical (benign) relativism could 
salvage Wright’s and Timmons’ theories by admitting some objective moral truths while 
maintaining a commitment to irrealism, if the preceding line of reasoning is on target, 
then it has now been demonstrated that moderate metaethical relativism collapses into 
extreme metaethical relativism.  If there are no judgments or commitments on which all 
systems of practical principles deserving of the title ‘morality’ agree—because there is 
third-order conflict over what systems of practical principles are in fact deserving of the 
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title—then there are no definitional criteria.  And if there are no definitional criteria, then 
there is no distinction between moderate and extreme metaethical relativism.  This means 
that Wright and Timmons are left with a dilemma: either they must accept extreme 
metaethical relativism and thereby fail to satisfy the project of internal accommodation, 
or they must substantially revise their theories so that they avoid relativism.  If they 
choose the latter horn of the dilemma, I hope the preceding discussion has provided a 
strong case that minimal truth may in fact be too minimal to play a part in accomplishing 
this task.         
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